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Arms control as a means of reshaping Europe

Frankfurter Allgemeine

What East and West have in common is their desire to spend less money on tanks and armed forces personnel. Where they are at odds is on what shape Europe is eventually to take.

Arms control is not the be-all and end-all of politics; it is the wherewithal of pact architecture.

Facts and figures, troop cuts and verification are all part and parcel of hegemony and the balance of power, of the survival of the Soviet empire and the nature of the Atlantic alliance.

Since the last Nato summit in Brussels the West has regained cohesion and thus stands a chance of being able to determine the political timetable of arms control.

What is at stake? Nothing much if America merely reduces its troop manpower in Western Europe by a fifth to 375,000.

But if the Soviet Union were to reduce its troop strength in Eastern Europe to the same level the foundations of the Soviet empire might well begin to shake. Compromise between rulers and ruled in eastern Central Europe would then be indispensable, and the Soviet leaders would need to consider how to transform their empire into a commonwealth.

Arms control has, from its outset, always been aimed at limiting the nuclear risk posed by the world powers. It has always been a tug-of-war for political and moral advantages too.

Even more is now at stake: the architecture of Europe East, West and Central.

Technical details, including the future of land-based short-range nuclear systems, are just that: technical details.

The West must consider what view of Europe lies behind the talks on conventional, chemical and nuclear arms and doctrines. It must also wonder what the Soviet leaders envisage.

And that means not just motives but objectives. The motives, especially in economic terms, are self-evident.

The Soviet Union spends what, in the long term, is an intolerably high proportion of its GNP — much more than budget statistics reveal — on armaments as the basis of its claim to world power status.

"Upper Volta plus missiles," as Helmut Schmidt once put it in an aside the Russians have never forgotten.

Despite a respectable performance on its own account the Soviet military-industrial complex has failed so far to stimulate the civilian sector, let alone to sweep it along.

What is more, Soviet military investment in, say, Afghanistan, Angola and Ethiopia has failed to pay the expected dividends. Much can be achieved with bayonets, as Talleyrand noted, but you can't sit on them.

The Soviet Union today is a world power only in military terms, but it is no secret that Mr Gorbachov is keen to transform his gigantic empire into a world power in every respect.

He needs a high-powered economy if he is to do so. He also needs a new flexibility and openness of Soviet society as a means of domination, discipline and control and, above all, as a means of mobilisation.

The West must do its best to ensure that the Soviet Union changes its structures and its foreign policy on the long road out of stagnation.

It must also seek to ensure that this change takes constitutional shape in domestic and treaty shape in foreign affairs.

What can now be seen in outline is the "civilisation of Soviet power" described at the outset of the Cold War by George F. Kennan as the long-term objective of Western security and containment policy.

Arms control retains a twofold meaning for the Soviet Union. It both rationalises the enormous, futile effort arms expenditure entails and continues the old strategy by new means.

Soviet diplomats have occasionally been heard to say that the "common European house" must be decorated by means of arms control.

Since the missile crisis the Soviet leaders have constantly protested that the US presence in Europe is, in their view, worth maintaining as part of a predictable order.

Yet they do all they can to denuclearise the western part of the continent, doubtless realising that the US military presence's days would then be numbered and the West would have forfeited its queen on the European chessboard.

The Federal Republic of Germany is where pressure is brought to bear in connection with this neutralisation strategy. The Cold War helped to set up and to stabilise the Federal Republic. It must surely be plunged into a crisis of orientation should the Cold War seem to be over.

The Soviet leaders cannot afford to ignore the fact that this may well lead to a clash between the world powers that imposes a heavy burden on restructuring in the Soviet Union.


To underestimate America is a dangerous Continental temptation, as governments in Berlin and Moscow have both found out to their cost at various times.

As the arms control game now stands on the European chessboard, the Kremlin will need to decide what its long-term aims are.

Does it want quiet on the Western front and evolution in eastern Central Europe, or would it prefer an ailing Nato and a direct clash with the other world power?

Michael Stürmer

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 3 August 1989)



Isn't it time we started talking about the foundations?

(Cartoon: P. Leger/Suddeutsche Zeitung)

IN THIS ISSUE

Berlin Wall the acid test of perestroika

Where Berlin is concerned the Soviet Union moves slowly, if at all, as evidenced by the belated Soviet response to the West's 19 December 1987 Berlin initiative.

The Western initiative was triggered by US President Reagan on 12 June 1987, when he called on the Soviet Union, in a speech by the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, to consent to practical easements for the people of Berlin.

What he proposed was improvements in civil aviation, more youth exchange schemes, more individual contacts and international encounters across the border between the Allied sectors in the divided city — and even holding the Olympic Games at locations all over the city.

These proposals were formally submitted to the Soviet government six months later in a memorandum signed by America, Britain and France. The three Western powers suggested first holding talks on these proposals at ambassador level, and the logic behind this suggestion was irrefutable.

If the Soviet Union was really keen on reducing tension in Europe, as Mr Gorbachov often claims, it ought to be prepared to undertake joint moves with the West to improve conditions for the people of Berlin.

There would be no need to change the city's status. All that was needed was to seek fresh approaches on the basis of the 1971 Four-Power Berlin Agreement.

Ought not the Soviet protagonists of glasnost and perestroika to have agreed with alacrity? They ought to have done, had it not been for dogmatists who vetoed the extension of "new thinking" to this sector.

The dogmatists' advice, very much along Brezhnev era lines, was: "No experiments in Berlin, if you don't mind!"

Soviet leaders from Gorbachov to Shevardnadze, who weren't yet firmly in the saddle, agreed to bide their time on this issue.

Initially, then, nothing happened. After waiting eight months the Western powers put in a fresh appearance at the Soviet Foreign Ministry and stressed "their continued interest in a prompt and positive response" to their December

Continued on page 2

■ INTERNATIONAL

Machinations, negotiations and hope in Middle East



Is it a breathing space that gives cause for hope? Or is it just the quiet before the storm, before the Middle East hostage drama comes to a head yet again?

The message from the Shi'ite extremists, horrific in its disregard for human life, that US hostage Joseph Cicippio's execution had been "frozen" was, first and foremost, time gained.

Efforts continue through many channels to defuse the situation and to sever the knot tied by the Israeli abduction of Sheikh Obeid.

They weren't upset by yet another horrific report such as the video film claiming to show the hanging of William Higgins, another US hostage in Beirut.

It is hard to say who is these efforts and who might best placed to win some success. The Israelis, berated by friend and foe alike as the initial offenders in this episode, have offered a comprehensive exchange of prisoners and have mentioned possible contacts with Shi'ite groups.

The Americans are sabre-rattling with one hand by sending in ships while, at the same time, sending out diplomats and sounding out possible intermediaries.

Less obtrusively, the Soviet Union is also engaged in behind-the-scenes diplomatic activities.

The superpowers have different interests in the Middle East; their client states might not be like each other; but neither America nor Russia can afford, in the age of detente, to work so hard against each other and to fan the flames of conflict still further

Recent instances of cooperation sound notes of confidence for the Middle East. The superpowers have at least set aside their differences in Afghanistan (even though the country has yet to come to rest), in Angola and now in Cambodia, where the prospect of peace is at least a possibility.

Yet despite the crucial part by the superpowers, a key man in the latest conflict is in Teheran, where newly-elected Iranian President Rafsanjani is trying to lead a country that still bears the hallmark of Ayatollah Khomeini out of its isolation and toward closer ties with the West.

He is likeliest to be able to influence his Shi'ite co-religionists in Lebanon. He alone, if anyone, is in a position to subdue the fanaticism of the Hezbollah and its units.

Even the Americans say he is seriously trying to do so, and they have been suspicious Iran since the US embassy hostage affair a decade ago.

Assume that efforts by those concerned, doubtless including Syria, which is firmly committed in Lebanon, lead to a solution of the hostage conflict consisting of a full-scale exchange of kidnapped Americans and Europeans and Israeli prisoners-of-war for a few dozen Shi'ites, including Sheikh Obeid.

The Israelis would then claim that their abduction of a Lebanese Shi'ite leader had been justified. The claim would be one the rest of the world would have to tolerate. It would be much more important for the newly-established network of international contacts not to be allowed to break down, for it to be used to try and solve the long-standing conflict between Jews and Arabs.

That may be considered a rash idea as long as the first problem has not yet been solved. It is also rash in that neither of the main parties to the conflict, the Israelis and the Palestinians, show any sign of yielding an inch.

Premier Shamir of Israel has proposed holding elections in the occupied territories and is prepared to hold talks with the Palestinians' elected representatives, as long as they aren't PLO members, on the future of the West Bank.

But this offer cannot be reconciled with the insistence, reiterated by the chief rabbis, on Israel yielding not an inch of the Biblical Promised Land.

PLO leader Yasser Arafat sounds conciliatory. He too has submitted a plan that would lead, via a few detours, to elections.

But he insists from the outset on the existence of an independent state of Palestine, which has been proclaimed but is anathema to the Israelis.

Mr Arafat lends constant support to the Intifada, the Palestinian unrest that began in December 1987. That causes even Israeli politicians who might be prepared to compromise to continue to mistrust everything he says.

They don't even want to take seriously his strongly-worded disapproval of the Shi'ite extremists in Lebanon. In calling on fellow-Palestinians to support the struggle Mr Arafat is strengthening the hand of Israeli right-wingers who want an even tougher line against the stone- and Molotov cocktail-throwing Palestinians.

The Arab world is by no means uniformly agreed that Israel's existence must be accepted. Some are deliberately bankrolling Palestinian groups who feel Mr Arafat is no longer sufficiently radical in outlook and see his peace probes as going too far.

It is mainly for the Soviet Union to bring about a change of mind on this point, leaving the United States to bring American influence to bear on Israel.

Are there grounds for hope in the hostage drama? Yes, provided the breathing space can be put to good use.

Are there grounds for hope in the Middle East conflict? Maybe, provided hopes are fulfilled on the first point. Maybe, but no more. *Reiner Dederichs*

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 5 August 1989)

Perestroika

Continued from page 1

1987 proposals. Five weeks later still, on 15 September 1988, the Soviet reply finally came — and it wasn't satisfactory.

It basically was a reiteration of the restrictive legal view already held by the Soviet Union and said the GDR was responsible for civil aviation and suggested the Allies negotiate details of international conferences and sporting events.

It was a cold shower, but experts found after analysis that Four-Power talks were not ruled out.

So the West made a further approach to the Soviet Union in December 1988, repeating its proposals. Silence then reigned for six months.

At the end of June the Allies reminded Moscow of their proposals, and at the end of July the three Western ambassadors outlined their proposals yet again in East Berlin.

The talks were cordial but their Soviet opposite number merely referred them to Moscow.

Unlike the optimistic interpretation of the chief Bonn government spokesman, the three Western envoys did not feel the talks had yielded much that was new.

Soviet officials were equally hesitant to commit themselves during Mr Gorbachov's visit to Bonn.

The Federal government succeeded in having included in the joint declaration the formula: "Berlin (West) will take part in the development of cooperation subject to strict observation and full implementation of the 3 September 1971 Four-Power Agreement."

Pragmatic arrangements resulted in certain sectors, but whenever written commitments were required, the Soviet Union preferred not to commit itself.

For instance when the Germans insisted, in connection with the agreement on inland shipping, on West Berlin ships being permitted to fly the Federal ensign.

At one stage Foreign Minister Genscher seemed to have persuaded, Mr Shevardnadze, to agree to a compromise. But a Soviet expert on Berlin, Mr Bondarenko, then intervened and persuaded his Foreign Minister to revert to inflexibility.

There will be no change in this state of affairs until the Soviet leadership troika, Mr Gorbachov, Mr Shevardnadze and Mr Yakovlev, finally agree to replace inflexible Brezhnev era formulas by "new thinking" on Berlin.

They will need to insist energetically on acceptance of this policy change throughout Soviet officialdom. The Berlin Wall will be the acid test of Mr Gorbachov's perestroika. *Bernt Conrad*

(Die Welt, Bonn, 4 August 1989)

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A matter of unravelling all the knots in the Cambodian tangle

Were it possible to draw inferences from the Paris preliminary talks between the four Cambodian groups on the success or failure prospects of the conference proper, the country's future would look bleak indeed.

No agreement has been reached in the talks between the Phnom Penh government and the resistance front.

In principle, although for different motives, all parties realise they must use the chance to negotiate peace terms.

The Soviet Union can no longer afford to use regional conflicts to distract attention from its domestic problems. So Moscow wants to put out any smouldering that might flare up into a fully-fledged East-West fire.

Vietnam, Moscow's unloved ally, needs capital and know-how to reconstruct, and Hanoi cannot expect either unless the conference is a success.

Peking wants to regain a foothold in the international arena and to recover from the loss of face it suffered in June.

The United States wants to end the Indo-China story. But the Cambodians themselves, at daggers drawn, hold the key to peace in the region.

Even if Indo-China returns to the headlines as a world hot spot the outcome of the Paris talks will be uncertain. They may be backed, and attended, by US Secretary of State James Baker, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, but none of these three are toeing the same line, and the dispute between the small fry reflects the viewpoints of the Big Three.

The details of international monitoring, under UN auspices, of the Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia have created fewer problems than had been feared.

But the great powers are no less at loggerheads than those directly concerned over participation by the Khmer rouge in a Cambodian government-to-be.

The spirit of Pol Pot hovers over the conference centre. His reign of terror not only plunged Cambodia into an era of Stone Age communism; it also cost two million lives.

So Secretary of State Baker categorically rules out participation by the Khmer rouge in a transitional government.

Oddly enough, he is backed by Vietnam and implacably opposed by China's Qian Qichen.

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has not yet dealt with details. He prefers to call for a fitting, suitable and dignified role to be played by the United Nations in any settlement.

Their conference tactics will surely show whether the protagonists can find common ground for a compromise.

The United Nations was paralysed for years by having allowed the guerrillas to represent and to vote for Cambodia at the UN, thereby acknowledging Pol Pot's killer squads as the country's legal representatives.

The UN stands a chance of consolidating its reputation for being a peace-promoting institution. But it will need to proceed with caution.

Neither an arrangement that is geared solely to international political configurations nor one that abides by terms of reference that are too narrow and merely take Cambodian demands into account stands any chance of achieving success.

What is needed is a "global model," as Mr Baker rightly put it.

Kid gloves will be needed to untie the knot of different interests and viewpoints and to forestall a civil war from the outset.

With his Namibia and Afghanistan credentials, UN secretary-general Perez de Cuellar could be just the man for the job. *Christoph Rabe*

(Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf, 1 August 1989)

■ HOME AFFAIRS

Reshuffled Cabinet takes stock after 100 days

The ministers in Chancellor Kohl's reshuffled cabinet claim that they did not regard their first 100 days as a "period of grace."

But before most of them left for their summer holidays they published documents designed to show their performances so far as favourably as possible.

Independent media critics and even the most critical members of the Opposition will find it hard to find fault with the information.

Statements by Chancellor Kohl, FDP chairman Count Otto Lambsdorff or CSU chairman and Bonn Finance Minister Theo Waigel to the effect that the coalition has regained its footing seem justified.

Virtually no mistakes have been made. Thoughtlessness, arrogance, exaggerated promises and carelessness in the field of public relations are no longer characteristic features of the new team.

Work in the reshuffled cabinet is marked by a greater sense of proportion and restraint. The paragon of discipline is Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble.

After just a few weeks in office Chancellor Kohl praised the fact he at long last again enjoys listening to what the Interior Minister has to say.

Schäuble spun a fine network of solutions to the problems connected with asylum applicants, foreigners in general and ethnic German immigrants in particular.

His attempt to carefully tackle the most hotly-disputed issue in German politics was not even countered by the accusation that there is there is no real link between the treatment of individual groups.

Schäuble referred to the general objective of limiting the influx of new citizens to an extent acceptable to German society as a whole. The link, and the need for regulation, is there.

During his period as minister of state in the Chancellor's Office, Schäuble was able to train the political tactfulness he now applies to his new task.

Unlike his predecessor in office, Friedrich Zimmermann, Schäuble does not shock the FDP and SPD with abrasive demands for an amendment of the Basic Law (Constitution) provision on the right of asylum or with sharp-tongued remarks on the need for a facilitated deportation of foreigners.

However, there has not been a complete change of heart in the Interior Ministry. Ministry officials feel that the new motto is "action speaks louder than words."

The 46-year-old CDU politician, who now sits beneath a Bismarck portrait by Lehnbach in a room on the 11th floor of the Ministry building, came to an agreement with the SPD-ruled *Länder* that the regional office of the Federal Office for the Recognition of Asylum Applicants in Zirndorf should be more closely dovetailed with regional Aliens Offices.

Successful cooperation could mean that over half of the more obviously unjustified applications for asylum could be processed within just a few weeks and the resultant deportations speeded up wherever necessary.

The SPD *Land* governments were able to bring their own interests to bear in this regulation, something which would not have been possible during the Zimmermann "era."

Schäuble cleverly removed potential bones of contention such as the privileged pension insurance treatment for civil servants and the initiative to introduce a shoot-to-kill regulation for federal police in hostage-taking cases. The new Interior Minister takes more time to talk to the FDP.

The new Finance Minister, CSU chairman Theo Waigel, had the biggest clearing-up task during his first 100 days.

The repeal of the highly unpopular 10 per cent withholding tax concocted by his predecessor in office, Gerhard Stoltenberg, the supplementary budget for immigrants and students, and the preferential tax treatment for rental housing construction are just a few of the fields in need of adjustment.

As opposed to the thrifty finance administrator Stoltenberg, Waigel thinks along more general policy lines — as demonstrated by his plans for financial assistance for Poland and for the 1990 federal budget.

But he is not excessively generous, a fact borne out by the new borrowing figure for 1990, which is lower than planned.

The reverberations triggered by Waigel's speech on the former German territories in Eastern Europe soon subsided thanks to his regular contacts with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP).

Waigel visited Genscher in hospital, where he was recovering from a heart attack.

Gerhard Stoltenberg is the first Defence Minister in Bonn to have made his peace with Genscher during recent years.

The experienced politician, who also seeks an amicable relationship with parliament and the defence committee, does not publicly highlight existing differences of opinion in the fields of armament and disarmament policy as disruptively as his predecessors.

Stoltenberg did not make any spectacular inaugural visits to the troops, visits which had previously underlined the inexperience of former Defence Minister Rupert Scholz. He is more interested in to-the-point talks with soldiers.

Following the decision-making spontaneity of Manfred Wörner and the more cursory style of Rupert Scholz, Stoltenberg carefully reads and compares the facts and figures.

The consultation of specialist committees is again regarded as an important means of orientation.

Stoltenberg carried out negotiations with the USA on the modernisation of short-range nuclear missiles noiselessly before the Nato summit.

Although there have been no positive headlines for the Bundeswehr, something which is virtually impossible during a period of growing disarmament, he has kept the armed forces out of the bad headlines. Wörner was unable to do a good job here.

Stoltenberg has only failed to live up expectations on the concept for the reduction of military low-level flying, a concept which was originally supposed to be ready in July.

The cabinet reshuffle 100 days ago numerically affected the CSU most. No-one complains today about the ministerial status of government spokesman Hans Klein.

Klein is not necessarily furnished with more and qualitatively better political information by Chancellor Kohl than the previous government spokesman, Friedhelm Ost.

But Klein is better because he risks more and because the language he use is tougher without being more brusque.

The new Regional Planning and Urban Development Minister, Gerda Hasselfeldt, has brushed aside the impression that the housing construction ministry is superfluous.

As opposed to her predecessor, Oskar Schneider, she is aware of the housing shortage and insists on the construction of a million dwelling units with a large proportion of low-rent housing for the socially disadvantaged, students and immigrants.

Friedrich Zimmermann, who was "demoted" from Interior Minister to Transport Minister, has at least overcome his initial disappointment.

He has stopped the habit of commenting, much to the annoyance of Chancellor Kohl, on general issues such as when he openly came out in support of the modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons.

Zimmermann's public "heckling" now concentrates on issues relating to his own portfolio, for example, the heavy transport levy for lorries or reorganisation concepts for the Federal Railways.

The Minister for Economic Cooperation, Jürgen Warnke, is keeping a low profile. This may change if German soldiers are in fact selected as members of the United Nations peacekeeping forces.

The new minister of state in the Chancellery, Rudolf Seiters, has kept very quiet indeed. This, however, is an indication that work is running smoothly.

Schäuble often had to mediate between CDU/CSU and FDP portfolios to find the best compromises. Seiters no longer needs to do this.

The new cabinet team has learnt from its previous mistakes.

Heinz-Joachim Melder

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 1 August 1989)

SPD talks with Greens in a delicate area

The SPD has manoeuvred itself into a tricky situation. Some Social Democrats may view talks being held with the Greens as no more than discussions on issues.

But the talks have long since turned into an uncontrollable political risk for the SPD.

For the Greens, on the other hand, they provide an opportunity to claim greater political significance than they deserve.

Social Democrats would be naive to believe that they can engage in such dialogues before major *Land* elections and the general election next year without being suspected of paving the way for a coalition with the Greens.

SPD leader Hans-Jochen Vogel has every reason to repeatedly insist that his party has no intention of taking part in discussions on possible coalitions or speculations on election candidates.

Up to now this policy was undisputed among leading SPD politicians.

In view of the problems facing the centre-right coalition in Bonn and the growing popularity of right-wing extremist groups the SPD wanted to keep all options open for the general election campaign.

Furthermore, the party hopes to obtain absolute majorities in the state elections in Saarland and North-Rhine Westphalia in January and May next year.

The answer to the chancellorship candidate question was scheduled for some time shortly before the general election campaign begins in earnest. This sensible strategy has taken a serious knock.

The Social Democrats who took part in or who supported talks with the Greens have plunged their party into speculations about a Red-Green coalition.

Was this the result of inexperience and inability or was it intentional? The politicians who attended the talks were by no means third-rate provincial politicians, but prominent members of the party's executive committee.

The Greens have every reason to be happy; all of the factions in the party are keen on talks with the SPD, since — as opposed to the Social Democrats — they only have one possible coalition partner.

To blame the SPD's predicament on the political naivete of a few of its members would be an oversimplification.

After all, there are clear points of contact between the interests of the Greens and many Social Democrats in terms of strategic and fundamental policy goals.

After seven years of the conservative-liberal politics of social inequality and environmental policy thoughtlessness both parties dream of a new social consensus.

The Greens would like a "Red-Green project", which a coalition after the 1990 general election could inspire.

In the SPD even members of the party executive enthuse about "reform alliances of the 90s."

This is a risk for the party, since those who succumb to such enthusiasm tend to forget political reality for all the visions.

There is no proof, for example, of an electoral majority for the SPD and Greens.

Furthermore, the initiators of the talks have overlooked the fact that historical alliances are not formed in elections or governments, but between political movements. The electorate has every right to be presented with political parties which have distinctive images and political goals.

If a "Red-Green" sauce is poured over both parties the Social Democrats will lose this image, an image which has taken many years to evolve.

Who is going to take the current programmatic discussion seriously if the SPD is at the same time engaged in public discussions on a joint reform project with the Greens?

Every programmatic decision by the SPD is merely viewed in accordance with the possibility of such cooperation.

The double strategy by leftist Social Democrats of strengthening their own position in the party by negotiating with the Greens is also fatal.

It overlooks the fact that only the Greens benefit from such a strategy.

It makes it easier for the Greens to force the Red-Green discussion onto the SPD and thus restrict its room to manoeuvre.

This is likely to result in appreciable electoral losses for the SPD.

The Greens for their part stand to gain from such an approach.

Their supporters have long since favoured cooperation with the SPD.

The talks with leading SPD members improve the party's public reputation.

The Social Democrats are helping the Greens cover up their own political and programmatic disunity.

The CDU is also likely to benefit, since it can now point to proof for its propagandist claims that the SPD has been set on a coalition with the Greens for some time now.

If the SPD does nothing to counter this impression there will be only loser in the end — the SPD itself. *Martin Winter*

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 2 August 1989)

PEOPLE IN POLITICS

A Christian Democrat Premier moves to allay the nagging doubts



Hesse Premier Walter Wallmann finds it difficult to understand why people complain that he rarely appears in public. His appointments diary is full.

A special file in his office confirms the ubiquity of the leading CDU politician.

Wallmann himself adds: "No other Land Premier has been out there in public as often as I have. On the contrary. I cannot do more than I do now."

In his own party's parliamentary group in the Hessian state assembly, however, a certain dissatisfaction about Wallmann's reputed public relations inactivity cannot be denied.

The mood of discontent spread following two crushing election defeats, especially since Wallmann is virtually the CDU's only political trump card for the 1991 state election in Hesse.

The 56-year-old party leader dismisses all rumours that he is weary of office or is in poor health.

He is more than willing to try to turn the political tables, but he needs the wholhearted backing of his party colleagues.

Such confident reassurances should suffice to establish greater composure in the CDU.

Wallmann takes every opportunity to emphasise that he enjoys being government leader.

He intends doing his utmost to ensure that his party stays in power the 1991 election.

The ruling CDU-FDP coalition was surprisingly obliged to take on the business of government after the elected SPD-Greens coalition collapsed in April 1987.

However, the doubts within the CDU about the appeal and reputation of the man who more or less deserves the credit for the election victory and the extremely narrow majority of one vote in the state assembly have not subsided.

Wallmann did not insist on taking on the job of government leader, but was recommended as a successor to Alfred Dregger following the latter's election defeat in September 1982.

The CDU knows that the strength of Wallmann's image is mainly rdoted in his excellent reputation as a mayor of Frankfurt (1977-1986) rather than in his political achievements at Land level.

Wallmann himself never grows weary of emphasising the achievements of his government at every possible opportunity.

He proudly points out that Hesse is the Federal Republic of Germany's most *successful Land*, "number one in economic development, research activities and foreign investments".

He stresses that during the past few years Hesse accounted for 20 per cent of all new jobs created in Germany.

Furthermore, he insists that his party's policy has been successful because the Federal Republic of Germany has also been successful.

A little praise, therefore, even for the Bonn coalition despite its political slip-ups over withholding tax, tax exemption for private aircraft fuel or the extension of military service.

In interviews Wallmann tries to convince his discussion partners of the appropriateness of the political course pursued by his government since 1987.

He sometimes seems at ease and relaxed, sometimes pensive, weighing up the arguments and statesmanlike.

He believes that there is a risk of an economic standstill if his party fail to stay in power in two years time.

A "Red-Green (SPD-Greens) blockade", especially in the energy and transport policy fields, would gamble away Hesse's chances of growth, says Wallmann.

The authority of his personality will probably help him overcome the opposition of his Finance Minister and "austerity commissioner", Manfred Kanther, when the election budget is pieced together in 1990/91.

Kanther, who cannot be regarded as Wallmann's close friend, insists on "strict spending discipline."

The opposite will be be true. Kanther, who was also the party's business manager, was forced to eat humble pie.

In the end the CDU parliamentary party was also obliged to give way on an issue highly rated by the party chairman: parliamentary reform.

According to one CDU member of the state assembly Wallmann only obtained the unity of the parliamentary party in this respect with the help of the full force of his personality.

During the scandal on parliamentary allowances in Hesse Wallmann propagated the idea of part-time MPs with a profession and a parliamentary mandate.

This suggests that Wallmann threatened to resign if the party opposed his ideas on parliamentary reform.

Wallmann's intervention in the ensuing discussion was a clever public relations move.

He justified his initiative by claiming that his only intention was to prevent damage to democracy.

Walter Wallmann needed this success after having kept a relatively low profile for so long.

Despite his denials many observers felt that he had moved out of the limelight of day-to-day politics in Hesse.

Wallmann still ignores failures, shortcomings and slip-ups such as the Hanau nuclear waste scandal, the hushed up breakdown at the Biblis nuclear power plant, the waste disposal problems or the hitherto rejected reduction of working hours for civil servants in Hesse.

Instead he works on polishing up his own image. The fact that the junior coalition partner, the FDP, is almost swallowed up by the CDU makes it easier for him to promote a more distinctive image.

His "solo runs" are feared in the cabinet.

He once turned up in a primary school, for example, and praised the integration of two mentally handicapped children which his own Minister of Cultural Affairs had previously criticised.

On another occasion he gathered information in a university clinic overnight and then admitted the disastrous state of nursing in hospitals denied by his Social Affairs Minister the day before.

He refers to the fact that Hesse has never before spent so much on social policy tasks and is irritated when people claim that the coalition practices "social coldness."

Wallmann can also count himself lucky that an unconvincing SPD Opposition is unable to capitalise on the government's weaknesses.

The small Greens parliamentary party led by Joschka Fischer cannot take on this task on its own.

It remains to be seen whether Hans Eichel, the new man in the SPD on which the party pins its hopes, will be an adequate match for Wallmann.

Wallmann has already formed his own



Built up a reputation as Frankfurt's mayor . . . Walter Wallmann.

(Photo: Poly-Press)

opinion on this matter: "The SPD today is not able to take on the responsibilities of government."

What about Walter Wallmann's visions?

"I don't like the word vision," he says and then lists some of his ideas.

He would like to see Hesse catch up economically with Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria.

He considers setting up additional institutions outside of universities for basic research in Hesse along the lines of the Max Planck or Fraunhofer Institutes.

He also wants to extend local public transport in urban conurbations taking into account environmental aspects.

He hopes for a solution to the problem of a shortage of teachers in primary schools and advocates shorter study and vocational training periods so that young Frenchmen, Englishmen or Italians will not take away jobs from the Germans after 1992.

He also wants more installations for genetic engineering in Hesse.

At present there is no indication that Walter Wallmann is weary of office. And his health?

Wallmann laughs when asked about his health. He has a medical check-up twice a year and his physician says that he is in good shape.

He gives observers the impression that he enjoys his job.

In the long run, however, he would like to have more time for his wife and for his "scientific interests."

His political career has long since "steamrollered" his original plans. "I would have like to have become a philosophy professor," the 56-year-old politician admits.

Heinrich Halbig

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 1 August 1989)

PERSPECTIVE

75 years since the First World War began

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG

Seventy-five years ago, on 1 August 1914, Germany mobilised and declared war on Russia. Two days later war was declared on France.

When German troops disregarded Belgian neutrality and invaded Belgium, Britain entered the war on 4 August.

Most Germans were convinced their country had been the victim of a brutal attack. Most people in Britain thought Britain was the victim of brutality. French people thought France was.

Most people on both sides thought: "We don't want to fight but we now have no other choice."

In Germany the declaration of war triggered a wave of enthusiasm that swept the entire country. After 40 years of peace young people looked forward to the change from everyday routine.

A young lieutenant said: "War is like Christmas." Older men agreed that war was a thunderstroke that would clear the air.

"The war will cleanse mankind of evil substances," the novelist Ernst Gläser had one of his heroes say. Many Germans of the day would have agreed.

But the war that was later to be known as the First World War was lost for Germany, on water even more clearly than on land, even before the first shot was fired.

The reasons dated well back into the 19th century. The creation of a German nation-state in 1866 and 1871 called into question once and for all the European balance of power established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

For the first time in centuries the Germans themselves were in control of the German Question.

Yet Bismarck was alone in realising that the new Germany would long need, in view of its troublesome location in the heart of Europe, to exercise restraint if it was to survive.

He knew that nothing would endanger the German Reich more seriously than German nationalism, which was all the more vehement for coming so late, unless it was to exercise self-restraint.

In 1887 Bismarck warned the Reichstag: "We are one of what Metternich called saturated states."

The Reich was only as strong as it was prepared to accept its borders, to come to terms with its endangered location in the heart of Europe and to give longer-established powers preference in world affairs, thereby remaining a predictable factor.

Bismarck's successor, Reich Chancellor Caprivi, continued a foreign policy of moderation. He appreciated that the Franco-Russian entente of 1892 in particular posed a deadly threat to Germany, which from then on relied entirely on Britain for its security.

As Germany progressed rapidly from an agricultural to an industrialised country and began to compete with Britain in world markets, its trade offensive had to be offset in terms of security policy.

In other words, Germany must do all it could to avoid challenging Britain. It must forgo further colonies and naval expansion.

Yet they were exactly what the German bourgeoisie dreamt of. Germany's future, said Admiral Tirpitz of the Navy Office, lay on the seven seas. Many Germans shared this sentiment,

Their ardour to draw level with the British cast caution to the winds.

Britain's world power status ruled out a German breakthrough from the Reich's central location. Britain had thwarted Napoleon's plans for world power and was to thwart Hitler's too.

At the turn of the century Tirpitz and the Kaiser felt this British bolt must be drawn or yield to the German claim for naval status. So all British offers of an alliance were ill-advisedly brushed aside.

Even in 1912, when Haldane, the British Defence Minister, called for a halt to the arms build-up, the Kaiser and his military advisers saw fit to ignore the proposal.

The balance of world power turned to Germany's disadvantage as a result.


The sentiment in Germany that Europe was not enough triggered a nervous response in Whitehall, as did the first attributes of world power status to which Germany laid claim.

Lord Esher was firmly convinced that in the foreseeable future a gigantic struggle for pre-eminence lay ahead between Germany and Europe.

There were growing fears in London that Britainmight no longer be in a position to defend itself on its own.

The result was the entente cordiale with France of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, which between them wrought a radical change in the balance of power in Europe.

Germany in contrast was so afraid of being isolated that it attached increasing importance to its pact with Austria. The Kaiser referred to ties between the two as "Nibelung loyalty."



Germany thus set aside the shrewd proviso Bismarck had added to his alliance commitments toward Austria.

In the event of a war between Russia and Austria, the Iron Chancellor had ruled, Germany would only support Austria if Russia was the aggressor.

In the final phase of the Bosnian crisis, in 1909, the chief of the German general staff, Moltke, expressly assured his Austrian counterparts that Vienna could rely on Berlin's support in the event of war irrespective of who was to blame.

This assurance involved a serious risk factor, as was to be seen only a few years later.

Germany was involved in the disputes of the disintegrating Austro-Hungarian monarchy, while Britain and France guaranteed Russia a dangerous degree of freedom to manoeuvre instead of making it clear to the Tsar that if he overdid it he would be left to his own devices.

In other words, both sides lacked a strong leader who was prepared to call the junior partners to order.

In both blocs there were, as a result, growing fears of losing an ally to the other side and being put to strategic disadvantage, not to say encircled or destroyed.

In this tense state of affairs only a spark was needed to light the fuse of full-scale war.

After the Sarajevo assassination the German Kaiser told his Austrian counterpart that "His Majesty will stand firmly on the side of Austria-Hungary, in keeping with his alliance commitments and his friendship of old."

The rigid provisions of pact commitments led to war on a scale no-one had anticipated. The 1870-style war of good cheer gave way to a war of attrition that cost 8.5 million lives in four years.

The front-line soldier, Ernst Jünger wrote, "entered new and elementary regions." The civilian population was similarly involved, with women, invalids and prisoners-of-war doing men's work in the factories.

In the end 11 million civilians were part of the war effort. Yet despite rationing over 750,000 Germans starved to death during the First World War.

It was a total war, yet merely the forerunner of a war that was even worse.

Werner Birkenmaier

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 29 July 1989)

Slithering into the loss of 10 million lives

British wartime Premier David Lloyd George, recalling in the 1920s how the First World War had begun, said: "We all slithered into it."

For decades this dictum served as an alibi to disprove the view that Germany was solely to blame for the outbreak of war in 1914.

We now know that in summer 1914 Germany was the only great power systematically preparing for war. The crisis that preceded it came to a head 75 years ago.

On 23 July 1914 Austria-Hungary served Serbia an ultimatum.

Four weeks after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, by Serbian nationalists, Britain, France and Russia had long ceased to expect such a harsh move.

The Austrian demands appeared unacceptable. The entente powers were not to know that they were intended to be unacceptable.

The German Reich egged the Austro-Hungarian monarchy on to pursue a hard line in order to provoke Serbia's protecting power, Russia, and then wage a continental war on Russia and France.

The Hamburg historian Fritz Fischer was first to prove this point. It earned him much abuse in the 1960s. But no-one has disproved it.

Germany wanted a war, as a means of enabling the German people, who had achieved nationhood too late, to gain world power status.

Germany's post-Bismarck foreign policy isolation was not due solely to the incompetence of his successors. Latent German dislike of Russia was increasingly enhanced by economic clashes.

Germany, in the throes of an industrialisation boom, needed export markets, and as Germany was no less keen to become self-supporting in foodgrains, the German market was closed to Russia's main export commodity, grain.

In 1914 the time seemed ripe for war, but Britain Indid not behave according to plan. Berlin was firmly convinced Britain would stay neutral.

The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum triggered a spate of diplomatic activity in European capitals, with attempts to mediate being undertaken.

British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference of European powers not immediately concerned — Britain, France, Germany (!) and Italy — and reassured Britain's ally Russia.

The surprisingly obliging Serbian reply to the ultimatum was a result of these mediation endeavours.

Britain was expecting Germany to counsel similar moderation in Vienna. Not until 27-28 July did it dawn on Downing Street that the Germans weren't interested in a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The Foreign Office's Sir Eyre Crowe noted on 28 July: "As far as we know the German government has yet to put in a single word by way of restraint or moderation in Vienna.

"Reassuring inferences can hardly be drawn as to Germany's goodwill."

Berlin was not satisfied with diplomatic success. The German government felt sure of an easy victory in the field.

The prompt Austro-Hungarian declaration of war, under pressure from Berlin, presented the other powers with a fait accompli.

Berlin was keen to see Russia mobilise, which would have cast the Tsar in the role of aggressor. But Britain refused to be misled into neutrality. War was declared on 1 August 1914. It cost 10 million lives.

Ulrich Knoche

(Lübecker Nachrichten, 23 July 1989)

■ BUSINESS

Daimler-Benz merger plan gets support

DIE ZEIT

The Monopolies Commission has approved the proposed merger of car-makers Daimler-Benz and aerospace specialists Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB).

(The Commission is not to be confused with the Berlin-based Kartellamt, or Monopolies Office which has powers to punish offenders and prevent takeovers. Only the minister can over-rule it. The Commission is advisory.)

It was a majority decision, with four in favour and one against. The merger is favoured by the Bonn government, but the approval will have taken a weight off FDP Economics Minister Helmut Haussmann's shoulders.

One of the four in favour, Winfried Haastert, a director of Thyssen Industrie, had been unconditionally in favour.

There was only one dissenting voice among the two scientists and three business people on the commission — Professor Ulrich Immenga, the chairman. He has long been known to disapprove of the bid.

It will make what is already the largest German industrial company, Daimler-Benz, even larger and in charge of what will be the largest German arms manufacturer by far.

"I personally," Göttingen commercial lawyer Professor Immenga said weeks ago, "can see no serious points in the merger's favour." But he was outvoted.

For Helmut Haussmann the commission's go-ahead came as an enormous relief after the merger, inaugurated by his predecessor, Martin Bangemann, had been vetoed in an unusually detailed and highly-rated ruling by the Federal Monopolies Office, Berlin.

Suddenly, the responsibility lay with the Minister, and it weighed heavily on him.

He could overrule the Monopolies Office if he felt the merger was of overriding economic benefit for the country, but the situation was extremely difficult for Herr Haussmann, who only took over the economic affairs portfolio at the end of last year.

Even Daimler-Benz and MBB experts were taken aback by the quality of the arguments marshalled against the merger by the Monopolies Office, which felt the two together would have a market-dominating position, especially in armaments.

True enough, Daimler and MBB would jointly be the largest arms manufacturer in Europe. The Bundeswehr, which buys 80 per cent of its equipment in Germany, could hardly cut it out of a major contract.

So it was hard for the Minister to create the impression that he was able to arrive at an absolutely impartial decision on such an important issue.

In reality, his hands were tied from the outset. What his predecessor had publicly approved and encouraged to the best of his ability could hardly be dismissed as not in the public interest by a fellow-Free Democrat.

The Monopolies Commission's opinion suited him down to the ground, especially as he has to give its views a hearing before overriding the Monopolies Office's veto.

The Monopolies Commission maintains a watching brief on mergers and acquisitions in the Federal Republic of Germany, publishing regular and one-off reports. Herr Haussmann can now claim to have been advised by this official body in the merger's favour.

He would in any case have found it difficult to veto the merger. Herr Bangemann, when he was Minister, and Erich Riedl, CSU, as state secretary at the Ministry, had virtually assured the merger candidates of Ministerial approval.

There are *persistent* rumours that Daimler-Benz board chairman Edzard Reuter has even been given an official assurance to this effect by the Ministry.

Early this year Professor Immenga dismissed the entire procedure as a farce. He was incensed that a Federal government which was in favour of the merger was in a position to override a veto.

What particularly riled him, as a lawyer, was that the Federal government was in the throes of undermining its own anti-monopoly legislation. "The entire procedure is a mockery," he complained.

Heedless of the Monopolies Office's strongly-worded veto of last April, the two companies have gone ahead with merger preparations so determinedly that they seem absolutely sure of themselves.

"We are confident the decision will be in (the merger's) favour," Jürgen Schrempp, board chairman of Daimler subsidiary Deutsche Aerospace, has repeatedly said.

Deutsche Aerospace is planned to combine the operations of AEG, MTU, Dornier and MBB, resulting in a Daimler division with DM12bn in turnover and a payroll of roughly 60,000.

Including MBB, the Daimler group will be the largest German company by far, with DM80bn in turnover and a payroll of roughly 380,000.

Even before Deutsche Aerospace was set up, in mid-May, Daimler arranged for MBB executives to serve on the board of directors.

Daimler even said who was to succeed Hanns Arnt Vogels at the helm of MBB. It was to be Johann Schäffler, at present board chairman of Daimler subsidiary Dornier. Even the name Deutsche Aerospace exuded self-confidence.

Continued on page 7

Shock over insurance firm's sale to French bidder

Some firms try to ward off corporate raiders, others readily sell a majority holding to foreign buyers. Some see independence as their salvation in the European internal market; the large Colonia insurance group has preferred to join forces with Victoire, a leading French insurer. But there is much more to this Franco-German agreement than meets the eye.

The sale of the second-largest German insurance group, Colonia of Cologne, by the group's majority shareholder, private bankers Sal. Oppenheim & Cie of Cologne and Frankfurt (with 53 per cent of Colonia's DM130m in paid-up capital), has been *the* surprise of the German insurance industry this year.

An insurance company doesn't change hands every day of the week for one, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany. For another, the sums involved are virtually unprecedented, both in Germany and in Europe.

The news will have come as a shock to the self-assured managing directors of Colonia, Nordstern and Kölnische Rück, Dieter Wendelstadt, Claas Kleyboldt and Jürgen Zech.

Wendelstadt and Kleyboldt had banked on independence and felt they were big enough to hold their own in the European internal market without capital links (other than on a reciprocal basis).

In retrospect, smiles about the 37-per-cent stake in Colonia subsidiary Nordstern bought by Winterthur of Switzerland will seem to have been somewhat supercilious.

Herr Wendelstadt, who was strongly opposed to the Swiss shareholding, has now come off second-best against Victoire, a smaller, French insurer.

Winterthur is now likely to sell its stake in Nordstern. It failed, like a dozen other European insurance companies, to make the running.

In the Federal Republic any merger of this size would be sure to run into trouble with the Cartels authority which is in Berlin.

In domestic terms a merger of this size would justifiably have given rise to fears lest competition was in jeopardy; in the European market Colonia and Victoire are welcome partners.

British and Italian insurers were among the losers. They too would have loved to buy into an existing company in the largest single insurance market in Europe.

That is the only way they could have hoped to gain a foothold in the German market, and selling the Colonia group to an insurer in another European Community country was the obvious option.

Oppenheim have *not* sold, incidentally. They retain a 30-per-cent stake in the holding company comprising Colonia and Victoire's European activities.

Why did Oppenheim choose to sell their shareholding to a French bidder? Maybe because of an intellectual affinity between neighbouring France and Germany, but surely because Victoire, the buyer, is an insurance group and not a bank.

If Oppenheim had sold their stake to a bank they would merely have saddled themselves with yet another banking competitor.

Sal. Oppenheim & Cie, private bankers for over 200 years, need cash, and plenty of it, to go it alone in Europe, which is easier said than done for a private bank.

The bank is shortly to be converted into a limited partnership with DM1bn in share capital. That surely speaks for itself.

Oppenheim hope to kill two birds with one stone by selling part of their insurance stake (an expanding business that has been increasingly difficult to accommodate within the bank's terms of reference) and raising capital badly needed to expand banking activities.

In a recent interview with *Die Welt* Alfred von Oppenheim made it clear he took a dim view of venturing too far into the provision of a comprehensive range of financial services.

Yet he ruled out raising outside capital while stressing the need to "selectively pick up or set up one business or another in Europe."

Colonia and Victoire, who jointly rank as No. 5 in Europe, are well matched. They know each other well from years of cooperation.

Victoire is the largest private insurer in France. Colonia has valuable know-how in industrial insurance and a considerable reinsurance capacity.

Both groups are European in orientation, while Colonia does a substantial amount of business in non-European Community countries.

Now the seemingly impossible has happened and a leading German insurance company has been taken over by an outsider, the industry is wondering who is next in line to be taken over.

Nürnberger has gone to ground by limiting voting rights and issuing registered shares that can only change hands subject to company approval.

Mannheimer has issued registered shares and feels secure with its majority shareholder.

Victoria has issued registered shares in the names of other insurers who are keen to see the Düsseldorf-based company stay independent.

The many mutual life insurers and public institutions are in no danger of being taken over. They are not for sale. But they may well trail the others in post-1992 Europe.

Harald Posny

(Die Welt, Bonn, 31 July 1989)

A monopolies watchdog

The Monopolies Commission was set up in 1973 to maintain a watching brief on mergers and acquisitions in Germany and to compile reports on them.

It was also to propose any amendments it felt were needed to anti-monopoly legislation.

The commission's five members are appointed by the Federal President on the advice of the Federal government to serve four-year terms. They must be independent and not serve industrial or commercial interests of any kind.

They submit their report on 30 June every other year. Their findings and recommendations are debated in the Bundestag.

In addition to these regular reviews of developments in mergers and acquisitions the commission compiles special reports of its own, and reports commissioned by the Federal government, from time to time. In specific instances, such as the Daimler-Benz takeover bid for Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm, the Federal Economic Affairs Minister may refer the bid to the Monopolies Commission for a report on which to base his judgment.

The commission comprises two scientists, its chairman Professor Ulrich Immenga (who has just resigned) and Professor Carl-Christian von Weizsäcker.

The other three members are from industry. They are Winfried Haastert, labour director of Thyssen Industrie, Wolfgang Herion, a middle-ranking entrepreneur, and Elke Weber-Braun, an entrepreneur and chartered accountant.

dpa/vwd/ap

(Rheinische Post, Düsseldorf, 3 August 1989)

■ THE STOCK MARKETS

Questions about role of banks as day of computer broking dawns



The leading German banks and the country's eight stock exchanges have agreed to step up computer trading in shares and bonds.

Computer trading is to help ensure that Frankfurt continues to hold its own alongside other international financial centres.

The banks first plan to run unlisted market dealings, then institutional trading in standard stock and Federal bonds via Ibis, the (computerised) inter-bank information system.

Computer trading is later to develop into a full-scale stock exchange, under government supervision, in its own *right*.

Conventional trading will continue, but only private investors' business and trading in regionally quoted shares will be handled on the floor.

In arriving at a fundamental decision in favour of computer trading, the banks and stock exchanges have laid a foundation that should help to ensure that Germany remains competitive as a financial centre.

That still leaves organisational questions unanswered. A decision has yet, for instance, to be reached on whether computer trading is to be based on the auction or the market-maker principle.

From the banks' point of view there are sound arguments in favour of the market-maker principle.

The market-maker must be prepared to buy and sell certain quantities of stock at the prices he quotes, personally or by computer.

This system is used in London, Tokyo and New York. Computer programs are available.

For this reason alone the market-maker system is likely to be less expensive to set up than an alternative based on the auction principle.

Besides, the market-maker is — as yet — the faster worker, needing no computer capacity to work out his quotations.

Yet this system, favoured by a number of banks, has its shortcomings, especially in a bear market.

When share quotations are plummeting the market-maker principle has proved less satisfactory than share auctions, with fluctuations tending to be more drastic.

In a bear market there can be good reasons for the market-maker, especially if no-one else is trading in a given paper, to stop buying shares and bonds.

This intention is regularly demonstrated by particularly wide margins between buying and selling prices, margins that soon slow the pace of trading and can even bring it to a partial standstill.

Stratagems of this kind can only be forestalled, always assuming they *can* be prevented, by as much competition as possible between market-makers.

Is the volume of trade on German stock markets sufficient to ensure this competition? Are not the big three High Street banks (Deutsche, Dresdner and Commerz) invariably going to be the market-makers for standard shares?

Perceptible fluctuations, fluctuations that aren't offset by a wider market, thus seem inevitable.

Even in London, where more shares are traded and competition is surely tougher, the market-maker principle has come in for criticism.

The alternative to the market-maker is a computerised broker at an electronic stock exchange run on the auction principle, with the computer registering supply and demand and calculating quotations.

Unlike the market-maker, the "computerised broker" has no personal interest, no matter how marginal, that might find its way into the way in which quotations are calculated.

Electronic data processing would thus be the most impartial manner of arriving at stock quotations at present conceivable. What is more, the "market depth" of the auction principle is greater.

Supply and demand are calculated on the basis of a wider range of dealings, probably resulting in less drastic fluctuations in the long term.

Computer trading has its drawbacks too, of course. Computer technology and software have yet to be put through their paces on a large scale on the world's leading stock exchanges.

So a computerised system along auction lines would probably be slower and more expensive than the market-maker alternative, although experience gained at smaller stock exchanges and in certain markets at larger centres has shown that computers are well able to handle broker functions.

So time is on the side of computer trading based on the auction principle.

In deciding, after lengthy hesitation, to go ahead with computer trading, German banks have laid the groundwork for ensuring that Germany remains internationally competitive as a financial centre.

It was, presumably, the only way in which the banks could ensure there was a constantly operational market on which shares and bonds were traded fast and inexpensively — as expected by institutional investors.

It is a move that will strengthen Frankfurt's position as a financial centre, since the computerised stock exchange will presumably be located there.

The next moves require careful consideration. Computer trading along auction lines would seem to be preferable alternative.

No matter how the computerised market is run, in technical terms, care must be taken to ensure that the stock exchange is not monopolised by the banks.

Suspicions that the lack of tangible clarity in computer trading was a cover-up for a conspiracy on the part of the leading German banks would be grist to the mill of debate on "the power of the banks."

Thomas Knipp

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 2 August 1989)

Daimler-Benz

Continued from page 6

Without the market leader MBB it would have been a grotesque exaggeration.

So it is hardly surprising that Daimler executives such as Heinz Dürr of AEG have written articles for MBB's house magazine, a privilege previously reserved for MBB's own management.

All that remains is guesswork whether Herr Haussmann will unconditionally approve the largest company merger in post-war German history.

He is expected to give his approval at the beginning of September. But will it be unconditional or will he specify conditions the two firms must fulfill before they can go ahead and merge?

Daimler-Benz and MBB seem sure there will be no serious restrictions. Daimler-Benz executives have been amazingly frank in saying they would not be prepared to accept them.

"We cannot imagine (there will be) any charges," says Deutsche Aerospace's Jürgen Schrempp in no uncertain terms.

Daimler says the merger would be called off if there were to be any decisive restriction, and the Federal government would be left with egg on its face after having launched the whole idea.

"The conclusion we have reached," Herr Schrempp says, "is that no parts can be removed from the entire package."

Economic Affairs Ministry experts also know from painful past experience on four occasions that a proviso of this kind is not much use.

A report compiled at the Ministry in 1986 arrived at the conclusion that such conditions were hard to enforce, "quite apart from the drawbacks of constantly monitoring them."

Even so, Herr Haussmann seems likely to make his approval subject to at least one condition.

The entire German arms industry is certainly working on this assumption and seems as convinced of it as if the details had already been outlined.

It is a condition that has two advantages. The first is the welcome opportunity it will provide for the Minister to pose not as a Daimler-Benz stoolpigeon but as a plucky politician who has forced *the industrial giant to make concessions.*

The other is that Daimler-Benz will not in the least be upset, the condition being one that the group's aerospace strategy will take in its stride.

Herr Haussmann seems likely to insist on MBB selling its stake in Krauss-Maffei of Munich before he will sanction the Daimler-MBB merger.

Krauss-Maffei, with about DM1.5bn in turnover and a payroll of roughly 5,000, mainly makes tanks.

Neither Daimler-Benz nor MBB stands to lose much from parting company with a 12.5-per-cent stake in Krauss-Maffei, of which Bavaria is the major shareholder.

Besides, Daimler executives could well do without the negative kudos of a tank factory with meagre profits and military contracts that have been on the decline for years.

Karl-Heinz Büschemann

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 4 August 1989)

■ AGRICULTURE

Direct buying gains popularity: Emma comes home beautifully packed

For more than four years, Heinz Brandeis, a secondary school teacher from Dortmund, has set off once a month in his car with his wife and three children for an 80-kilometre journey to the Münsterland region.

During their last trip they all looked forward to seeing how Emma was coming along.

Soon, Emma will accompany the Brandeis family back to Dortmund — cut up in nice little pieces in the boot of their car.

For all those who have not guessed, Emma is a fully-grown pig at its tastiest age. A kind of foster pig.

Emma and her fellow swine were adopted by the city people when they piglets. The adoptive family thus ensures a future option on ham and sausages.

In the pigsties of farmer Hartmut Wieschke, whose rent-a-pig idea not only makes him independent of the fluctuating market prices for pork produce but also provides him with a regular basic monthly income, roughly three dozen pigs can be regularly heard grunting.

The whole venture has the noble prefix "Bio." The "godfathers" of the pigs pay DM52 a month per head of pig.

In return they receive a professionally dissected and biologically fattened pig in deep-freeze packaging after one year.

Just as meteorologists give names to their hurricanes the Brandeis family has given names to its adopted pigs in alphabetical order.

The first in the series was Amanda, which ended up in cutlet form in 1985. Emma is number five; number six will be called Frieda.

The family keeps a wary eye on the biography of their meat suppliers and combines control checks with a shopping outing to buy fresh vegetables, eggs and other biologically grown food.

Farmer Wieschke is satisfied with the way things have worked out. No matter what he produces it is all sold to his regular customers from the city.

His 60-hectare estate produces almost all types of food. He has no worries about transport.

His customers turn up regularly on weekends. He often has to turn one of his fields into a car park.

On Sunday afternoons the farm looks like something out of Disneyland. On sunny days in June farmer Wieschke's wife has often baked over 12 trays — 144 portions — of strawberry cake. Daughter Beatrix tops up her pocket money by making coffee and cocoa.

The catering sideline probably takes place unknown to the finance office. Farm subsidies without the red tape, so to speak.

When the visitors come along Wieschke has plenty to do keeping the "stress" away from his animals.

As he uses no chemical powders or injections he sometimes has trouble making sure the visitors do not make the pigs too nervous.

"As a rule," he says, "we don't have any problems. After all, chickens and roosters, pigs and cattle grew up together with loads of children at farms a hundred years ago."

No cock crows when four-year-old Sven starts chasing a hen or ten-year-



old Annabell starts pulling the pig's tail. On-the-spot biology? Natural science first-hand?

German city dwellers have long since realised that city life does not provide the freedom once praised at the beginning of industrialisation.

People who have only ever seen (purple) cows in chocolate commercials, pigs cut up in their various parts and packaged in plastic in supermarkets, and who are not really certain whether rabbits lay eggs have an irresistible urge to return to nature.

Parents who have to bring up their children in an asphalt jungle with a decorative dash of test-tube green are not only keen on finding buttercup meadows and peaceful forests, but also on tracing the roots of their ancestors.

Above all, however, watery and wrinkled steaks, standardised Euro-tomatoes and vegetables, which differ at most in appearance but not in taste, have turned consumers against the "blessings" of industrialised farming.

Consumers are also unhappy about lengthy distribution channels and food processing which robs the food of its natural origins.

A number of farmers have recognised this trend and set up a direct marketing network.

Officials estimate the number of "supermarkets between shed and barn" at 25,000 or more throughout the land — with a rising trend.

A specialist farming journal recently discovered that almost all West Germans (94 per cent) would prefer to buy their food directly from the producer.

This is precisely what more and more people are doing. Apart from the farms there is a growing interest in weekly markets.

For decades they had at most nostalgic value in the historically revamped inner cities.

Thousands of farmers stack up their lorries in the early morning with fruit, vegetables and eggs and sell their wares in urban residential areas. They have no sales problems.

In the vicinity of Paderborn one mobile farmer sells the milk from his own cows in reusable bottles which are filled on the doorstep.

And what about hygiene problems and food quality control?

The clever farmer explains the secret of his: "The customers know what they are buying. And no-one has ever got cancer by drinking sour fresh milk."

Five housewives nod in agreement, visibly grateful for the goods the farmer brings to their door.

Apart from the milk the farmer also sells lumps of butter wrapped in ordinary greaseproof paper.

The smell reminds many people of their childhood years, back in the days when butter smelt like butter.

The butter is produced only five metres away from the cow which was previously milked.

According to the most recent agricultural report by the Bonn government farmers suffered an over ten per cent loss of income in 1988.

The farmers are obviously more than pleased about the growing popularity of direct buying.

Many farmers openly admit that they would have long since had to close down their farms were it not for the loyalty of their city customers.

Bureaucrats, of course, have also noticed the growing popularity of the new distribution channels.

Farmer Wieschke feels certain that if they had their way everything would be regulated and perhaps fixed prices introduced.

Together with his other direct marketing colleagues he is convinced that the customers would then stop buying.

"They want to bargain and go home with the feeling that they have made a good deal."

The price of vegetables, potatoes, eggs and poultry is often much lower when produce is bought directly from the producer than in the next best supermarket.

Of course, this does not include the costs of getting to the farms out in the country.

Some people combine their shopping spree with a weekend trip, like the Brandeis family. The farm becomes a kind of leisure park.

Although not everything is "biologically" grown on the farms the produce does have the advantage of being fresh.

Not only nature-loving muesli freaks turn up. Most of the customers are better-off middle-class families.

Farmer Wieschke, however, has also detected a number of not so well-off customers who come from the city of Münster 25 kilometres away from his farm. They cycle out to the farm, Dad up front with a small trailer.

This reminds Wieschke of the time 40 years ago when the people came out foraging to find food to survive.

In those days, however, they paid for vegetables and cutlets with carpets and household goods. Today Wieschke only accepts cash.

Carlheinz Willmann

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt Hamburg 28 July 1989)

A farmer abandons pesticides and regains his health

Farmer Walter Gaiser used to spray chemicals on his crops. He used to feel ill and his health deteriorated.

Then he found the answer. No chemicals. He turned to biological farming. That was 20 years ago.

Today, Gaiser, who comes from Walddorfhäslach, near Tübingen, says he feels much healthier and has no trouble working. This is something of an understatement in view of the fact that he works a 12-hour day.

Organic-biological farming, however, is not as profitable. But he is able to get higher prices for cleaner and more natural produce, a market niche which ensures a livelihood for a growing number of farmers.

Gaiser successfully eliminates pests by using insects. He produces the soil for his plants himself, refrains from using chemicals altogether, and uses organic fertiliser only.

As a result his plants look just as good as those sprayed with chemicals and taste better. He is satisfied with quality.

Gaiser is able to keep up with the trends which make the range of food people eat much more colourful than they used to be.

He now grows all kinds of vegetables and salads and has no trouble finding buyers: "The number of private customers is steadily growing."

But there are still a lot of people who pooh-pooh his efforts or even show open hostility. He wishes some of his (chemical-using) farmer colleagues were more open-minded.

The higher prices for produce grown on an organic-biological basis seem justified when Gaiser starts explaining just what is involved.

The yield is often smaller, the cultivations take longer to mature, and there is more cost-intensive manual work.

If the growing number of farmers who switch over to this approach is anything to go by the additional time and effort, however, would appear to be worthwhile.

One of these farmers is Peter Bosch from Tübingen, who used to favour conventional farming methods.

During recent years he has made less use of chemical sprays and fertiliser. Now he intends switching over altogether to organic-biological farming.

He hopes that the state subsidy paid to farmers who agree to grow less will provide a financial safeguard.

Bosch feels that adopting the new approach is a chance for the future.

Due to the falling price of wheat and the decline in the revenue for fattened pigs Bosch's profit margin plummeted during recent years.

He even questions the use of the word "profit." He expects figures to move into the red in the next few years.

He hopes that organic-biological farming will improve his financial situation in the near future.

The Association of Organic-Biological Farming, Bioland, to which both Bosch and Gaiser belong, makes sure that consumers can trust in the natural quality of the produce of such farms.

The Association currently controls activities and operates in seven federal states.

In Baden-Württemberg 250 farms operate under the Bioland label.

The will to produce more as well as more cheaply has resulted in cleared out fields, the disappearance of certain types of plant, pollution of the ground water and a declining number of farms Helmut Gundert, the secretary of the Baden-Württemberg section of Bioland explained.

The Bioland farmers make a commitment to refrain from the use of chemicals, which explains the unpopularity of the organisation in industry.

Before a farm becomes a full member of Bioland it has to practice organic-biological farming in line with the requirements and under the control of the association for four years.

Veit Müller

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 1 August 1989)

■ SPACE RESEARCH

Rubbish orbiting at 20,000 mph brings the age of the armour-plated platform

Space research is increasingly becoming endangered by its own space garbage. Manned space missions, such as space stations or platforms, now need expensive armour plating.

The Federal Research Ministry in Bonn has commissioned a report on space debris from Brunswick University department of space aviation and reactor technology.

The report will not rule out, "in the none too distant future," and presupposing a further increase in international space research, manned missions becoming impossible because of the danger of a direct hit.

Space research has always been endangered by, say, meteorites. But man-made space debris that has accumulated over the past 30 years is the more serious problem.

Dietrich Rex, head of a space debris working party set up by Esa, the Paris-based European Space Agency, says there must be several hundred thousand artificial objects in outer space that could destroy satellites and other space vehicles.

Even particles a few millimetres in diameter can be dangerous when they score a direct hit at speeds of 30,000kph (20,000mph). They will at least pit the outer surface of a space vehicle.

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG

Armour plating can provide protection from the impact of these specks of space debris, which are usually the result of satellites or missiles exploding.

But there are a further 60,000-odd items in terrestrial orbit with a diameter of at least one centimetre that would be sure to cause serious damage if they scored a direct hit.

The risks space debris poses have yet to be fully appreciated, Professor Rex says. He feels the amount of debris would have been much lower if care had been taken soon enough to prevent spent rocket stages and satellites from exploding in outer space.

But as recently as in 1986 an upper stage of the Ariane, Europe's prestige launcher rocket, exploded in space and added to the carpet of orbital debris.

The experts recommend designing at least larger satellites and space stations so they can be returned to Earth in one piece at the end of their missions.

Professor Rex says satellites and space stations must either be reused or ditched at sea.

In the United States the President has ruled that space debris must be avoided wherever possible, and this directive has resulted in corresponding projects being included in the US space research programme.

But an estimated 500 new items a year are put into orbit from all over the world, and there are no effective international controls. So debris continues to mount up, and with it the risks faced by space missions.

Research scientists distinguish between risk categories at specific altitudes. At low altitudes — of up to about 500km — the risk is said to be fairly low.

That is because debris at this altitude is braked by friction in the upper atmosphere. It usually either burns out or crash-lands back on Earth sooner or later, often within a few months.

At higher altitudes this self-cleansing effect no longer operates. Altitudes of between 800 and 1,000km and about 1,500km are classified as high-debris.

They are particularly dangerous because debris at these altitudes will stay there for thousands of years, and because space debris in these strata can, to all intents and purposes, only increase.

Even worse, the Brunswick scientists say collisions in these danger zones could cause even more debris, leading to further collisions. Space missions, manned or unmanned, would then be virtually impossible there.

The Brunswick research department's Peter Eichler warns against taking it easy. The risk of a collision with space debris is no longer an abstract problem. It has, he says, become a serious threat.

The impact of an object one centimetre in diameter has the explosive effect of a hand grenade. Armour plating is not enough. Debris must be spotted in advance and evasive action be taken.

The Federal Research Ministry plans to act, having concentrated since 1986 on research to sound out the extent of the risk and the countermeasures that might be taken.

An Esa coordination unit is to be set up to liaise international activities. There are plans for a data bank in which to store details of space debris. Professor Rex has also suggested involving the United Nations.

Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber, CDU, can expect his fellow-Christian Democrats to dismiss these measures as insufficient.

Christian Lenzer, research expert of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, has proposed an internationally administered fund to finance measures to eliminate space debris.

Whenever a satellite was launched, the operator would be required to pay an agreed contribution to this fund.

Herr Lenzer has called on the Federal government to submit by the year's end a report on activities it has undertaken to reduce the amount of dangerous debris in outer space.

The Research Ministry has yet to comment on either the fund or the call for a report to be issued.

Frank J. Eichhorn

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 25 July 1989)





■ THE ARTS

Onslaught of philistines a dismal failure

SüddeutscheZeitung

All the talk and complaints about "supermarkets of culture", theatre as a place of distraction, and the alibi art of the rich, idlers and philistines do not appear to have had the desired effect: the big festivals are still "in."

Some people have been trying for years to get tickets for the Bayreuth *Ring der Nibelungen*, to experience one of the main works of Richard Strauss or to attend one of the big Salzburg premieres.

In Bayreuth, where ten times as many tickets could be sold (the news that a Bayreuth production is to be presented in an opera house built especially for this purpose in Japan is regarded as a sensation!) the dress rehearsals are also overcrowded and are artistic events.

Numerous authors and intellectuals, for example, came along to the dress rehearsal for *Siegfried* this year.

They uncomplainingly experienced how the second act of the dress rehearsal began with considerable delay because the dragon of all protagonists was indisposed.

The fact that the Bayreuth festival has (again) been taking place *regularly* since 1951 and the Salzburg festival (again) since 1945 can by no means be taken for granted.

It is a tremendous organisational achievement, the result of active cultural energy.

After Richard Wagner completed the first Bayreuth festival in 1876 with a huge financial loss no more festivals were held for six years.

The annoyed composer described the festival theatre as a "foolish mood" and wanted to emigrate to America.

During Cosima's production of *Tristan und Isolde* three years after Wagner died the festival theatre was almost empty. Only twelve tickets were sold for one of the performances.

The festival theatre was closed during the First World War and inflation impoverished the Wagner family.

The theatre reopened in 1924 with the *Meistersinger*. General Ludendorff was in the audience.

"The audience listens to the final address by Hans Sachs while standing and sings the German national anthem at the end of the performance."

Hitler patronised Bayreuth, provided 55,000 reichsmark for every new production, and could afford to send visiting cards to the entire audience:

"The *Führer* requests not to sing the national anthem or the Horst Wessel song or to engage in similar demonstrations at the end of the performance."

During the Second World War Bayreuth was by no means closed down.

The *Meistersinger* was performed in 1943 and 1944 in the stage-set of Wieland Wagner.

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* reported that the wartime festival was intended as a token of respect for and a contribution towards the final victory.

After 1951 Bayreuth fought to rid itself of the association with the Nazi era.

This was no easy task. As late as 1949, for example, the noble and unforgotten critic Count Johannes Kalckreuth wrote that "Attic performances" should be staged in Bayreuth — and if Bayreuth cannot respond appropriately to the turning point in world history: "Then it would be better to do without Bayreuth!"

The captivating artistic, intellectual and mythological-cum-political appeal and significance of the Wagnerian musical dramas pulled through, shaken by crises and marked by critical reviews which soon turned into approval and applause.

Wieland Wagner, one of Richard Wagner's grandsons, set new standards as director.

He announced that an end must be put to the popularity-seeking approach by Sachs.

This was his way of justifying his highly critical *Meistersinger* production together with the denazification of the Nuremberg cobbler Hans Sachs.

The activity of the other Wagner grandson as head of the festival was more important for Bayreuth's fate.

Wolfgang Wagner was able to sustain and increase Bayreuth's fascination up until today.

He feels that good theatre has just as much to do with *persistence, cultivation, risk* and *the revolutionary*.

By means of courageous and unforeseeable decisions for "renewers" (such as Patrice Chereau and Harry Kupfer) as well as for "custodians" (such as Peter Hall and Jean-Pierre Ponnelle) Wolfgang Wagner ensured that Bayreuth continues to attract the most brilliant directors and singers in the world.

Wolfgang Wagner, however, will be celebrating his 70th birthday on 30 August.

He seems just as unconcerned about Bayreuth's fate after he dies as Karajan was about who could be his successor in Salzburg.


Or is this Wotan by the name of Wolfgang, hopefully with more luck than the father of the gods, already training a new and young (perhaps female) Siegfried for Wagner's Valhalla?

After all, the artistically most exciting festival venue in the world is at stake, the success of which no longer depends on individual successes or slip-ups.

Bayreuth today is a mixture of "work in progress", considerable know-how and expressively inspired music.

And there is no need for concern that the audience might start bawling *Deutschland, Deutschland über alles* following Harry Kupfer's nuclear-contaminated, post-modern, indeed post-Chernobyl "Ring" cosmos. In Salzburg, which

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Nice if you can get a ticket for it . . . the 1989 production of *Parsifal* in Bayreuth. (Photo: Bayreuther Festspiele GmbH/Rauh)



Calls for music festival's director to resign now

A critical television report has renewed controversy over the director of the Schleswig-Holstein music festival, Justus Frantz.

The question of fees for the artists involved in the festival only appears to be the main bone of contention.

The real problem is the haggling over concepts, venues and festival responsibilities.

The dispute has damaged the festival's reputation, disturbed the overall atmosphere and had an adverse effect on ticket sales.

As no-one questions the festival's basic idea the time has come to answer the question whether this institution would be better off without Justus Frantz as its manager.

In March this year Frantz himself announced that he would be seeking a new task when his contract expires at the end of 1992.

"I would have done a bad job if it cannot continue without me," he said, adding that he is naturally replaceable.

Frantz critics and a growing number of music lovers, however, are beginning to ask themselves why bother waiting until 1992. The size of the festival has always been controversial.

Frantz began in 1986 with 100 concerts in six weeks. Last year the festival was extended to 10 weeks and included 331 concerts.

Many seats remain empty; 340,000 people cannot be persuaded to attend concerts in the concert halls, churches and barns every year in Schleswig-Holstein.

Schleswig-Holstein Premier Björn Engholm (SPD) has warned against making the biggest festival of classical music in the world even bigger.

The festival, however, is already in danger of being stifled by the sheer number of concerts.

Whereas Engholm would like to limit the size of the festival to between 140 and 200 concerts there are already 181 concerts in the official programme this year and the total number will increase to well over 200 due to additional concerts organised at short notice.

Professor Frantz is accused of failing to realise his limits. He does not appreciate that the lustre of the novelty of his brilliant idea has gone and that the jubilation of the festival's early years has faded.



In a spot of bother . . Justus Frantz (Photo: Peter Peitsch)

As the opening concert began in the Lübeck cathedral on 25 June, which was broadcast live this year on German television, thousands of tickets were piling up in the central ticket office in Kiel.

Frantz, whose sponsor limousine has a telephone and a telecopier, is criticised for having used festival funds intended to cover personnel and material costs for other activities and for having increased costs by organising additional concerts which were not covered by the normal budget.

For many years the festival committee simply approved of everything Frantz organised.

A few months ago, however, committee member Ulrich Urban resigned. The remaining committee members are also apparently no longer to tolerate the whims and wishes of the festival "initiator."

The impressario is trying to do too many things at once. This strained atmospherics during the festival orchestra's major European tour.

According to reports by the NDR broadcasting corporation in Hamburg the young orchestra pupils hardly ever saw Frantz personally and were surprised to read the remarks by him in a popular daily newspaper following the death of Herbert von Karajan.

They are also reputed to have been irritated at rumours that the festival director collected DM25,000 for a concert in Berlin.

More and more people are asking whether pianist Frantz, who owes part of his current image to the festival, is primarily interested in the festival as a business venture.

As director of the festival he earns an annual income of DM180,000 plus expenses.

What is more, he earns plenty of cash every time he appears as a pianist and, according to the television report, he also earns DM150,000 a year as an orchestra adviser to the Bayrischer Rundfunk radio station.

There are also rumours that he intends becoming professor at the Hamburg College of Music.

As all these things have been the subject of public discussion for many months now no-one is surprised that the festival's reputation has suffered.

The dispute over the transfer of the festival directorship to Hamburg, the extension of the festival to the Lower Saxony and the director's flight to America in a Concorde are still in the

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■ THE ARTS

Death of author, political scientist and essayist

Author, political scientist and philosopher Dolf Sternberger has died just one day before his 82nd birthday. Between 1962 and his retirement in 1979, he was director of the Institute of Political Sciences. He wrote for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and, between 1964 and 1970, was president of the authors' association, PEN, in Germany. He made a name as a witty essayist.

Those who met him and even more so those who knew him well were always aware of the fact that he was an exception.

His presidential demeanour and a mixture of warmheartedness, an enthusiasm for discussion and integrity made him the centre of attention wherever he appeared.

Dolf Sternberger was a man of learning who, strangely enough, did not found a school of thought but who did teach numerous now-influential scholars.

At the same time he was a political man of letters, who did not share the German resentment of politics, rejected the antagonism of "intellect and power" and spoke instead of a *Staatsfreundschaft*.

As a journalist he possessed both passion and a strict sense of categorisation.

He combined intellectual acumen with fluency and literary elegance, astutely formulating even the most difficult content despite all his self-confident gravity.

The most admirable aspect of his personality was that, for sixty years, he wrote about and commented on a period which appeared to necessitate many concessions. Sternberger, however, never went back on his word.

He brought his entire personality into all that he wrote.

His Hessian dialect, which he had refined over the years, could be heard in his style: an unmistakable blend of resolution and respect for the views of others.

He had many friends and even more admirers in the editing offices of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland*, a newspaper for which he wrote articles for thirty years.

Up until recently he was willing and able to provide criticism and stimuli as a guest at various conferences.

Even after he was unable to attend such conferences for reasons of age he expressed his opinions in the form of letters written by hand, in which he formulated praise, supplementary recommendations and opposition.

He loved discussion, the joy of exchange and of intelligent dispute.

He knew how to give his seriousness a more charming form.

He once claimed that writing is only another, more concentrated form of intelligent conversation. His words were always directed at the person to whom he was introduced.

He described the ideal discussion situation, which he sought and knew how to create, as an "interplay of enchantment and intellectual defence."

His treatises and essays do not contain the scientific jargon which claims to struggle with the substance of language, but is no more than an expression of contempt for the reader.

The genius of congeniality, an idiosyncratic feature despite all the imperious traits, determined the direction of his thinking.

He never forgot that theory is only the means to greater knowledge, not the end itself.

In his scientific analyses of power, the state and the constitution he focused on the concrete individual as the object and addressee of politics.

He insisted that practice must pass judgement on all political theory.

This unwaveringness not only kept him away from totalitarian concepts, but also represented a dividing line to such differing minds such as Martin Heidegger or, despite personal sympathy, Ernst Bloch.

Sternberger basically gauged politics according to strictly moral criteria.

Not, however, from a position of arrogant dissociation from reality, a stance which he classed as one of the reasons for German distress.

He never drifted into the jarring or extreme, but tried to show reason is superior to what is merely original. Once again an exception.

The differentiations he regarded as undeniable were very simple.

In the final volume of his collected works he wrote that the contrast between good and evil crops up again and again in his works as "an everlasting characteristic of human existence."

He maintained that the experience of this century has "fundamentally disproved the hallucination of a moral emancipation once and for all."

"Beyond good and evil there is in reality no more to experience than even more evil."

He was constantly aware of the fact that a democratic polity is a risky and

Frankfurter Allgemeine

jeopardised venture, especially with the unlimited demands of covetousness and envy as new human rights.

He regarded the link between freedom and responsibility, happiness and duty as insoluble.

One aspect can never exist without an understanding of the other.

The gradual loss of this realisation was something which really concerned him.

Total emancipation, he postulated, which has so many unsuspecting champions, always ends in some form of total rule.

The step towards the pragmatic, which he made at a late stage in life, towards reflection on the state, constitutional questions and questions relating to electoral law, seems all the more astonishing in view of his unpolitical beginnings.

He was once a man of academic insularity, a period during which he openly admitted in a review of the early Heidelberg years with Karl Jaspers and Viktor von Weizsäcker (an uncle of the current Bonn President Richard von Weizsäcker) "he once encountered happiness."

The change from philosophy with all its possibilities of free observation and description to the "tied" thinking of politics was no easy task.

Time forced him to make the move. The experience of the objectionability of Nazi rule helped him grasp politics as a literally vital aspect of life.



In tradition of French moralists . . . Dolf Sternberger. (Photo: Brigitte Friedrich)

Perhaps there is a formula which links and perhaps reconciles philosophy and politics.

Sternberger basically continued the tradition of the French moralists in the German language.

Their philosophising is not aimed at developing self-contained conceptual systems nor designs of the world, but has no other objective but to teach people the art of living: in the political and in the private sphere.

He once pointed out that his use of the word "essay" is a token of respect for the French word *essai*. In his journalistic work he was inspired by the free and playful style of thinking of the moralists.

All past histories were readily retrievable, in his eyes no more than a different present.

This enabled him to uncover more profound historical interrelationships beneath passing and trivial phenomena and detect the special historical details of everyday life.

In one of his books he discovered the characteristic elements of the physiognamy of an epoch in the panorama pictures of the 19th century or made Marlene Dietrich a key figure of a cryptic interpretation of a certain period.

In this and in other works which demonstrated his delight in vivid and lively details he showed that the essence can be illustrated in the light of apparently insignificant factors and that there are no banal phenomena, merely banal outlooks.

Together with the French moralists his style was also marked by an incessant reflection on death, which was already the subject of his doctoral thesis.

If philosophy's intention is to teach life, then to teach death too.

This, however, is where thought was confronted by an insurmountable obstacle.

The very fact of death, he claimed, explains the failure of all philosophies.

He readily cited the words of Kleist in *The Prince of Homburg: "Zwar eine Sonne, sagt man, scheint auch dort..."*, a poetic description of what he could neither accept nor resolve.

He seemed to be most keen on remarks which ironcially questioned death.

On his 80th birthday he quoted a remark made by Sir Thomas Browne: "The long habit of living indisposes us for dying."

Sternberger would have liked to have grown even older. He still enjoyed observation, writing and extending his wealth of knoweldge.

In his works and discussions he often used Montaigne's term *visage ordinaire*, employed by Socrates in the face of death.

He hoped for nothing more than this philosophical composure, even though he never discovered it himself in philosophy.

Joachim Fest

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 28 July 1989)

Filling in some rhetorical empty spaces

What does rhetoric require? William Hamilton, a keen observer of the British parliament in the 18th century, listed five key aspects: ideas, order, eloquence, memory and elocution.

Hamilton knew what was needed and lived in a country with high regard for the art of rhetoric.

This was not the case in Germany. Rhetoric was viewed disdainfully ever since it was criticised by Kant and Schiller as well as by the Romantics.

The result is only too familiar: the equation of rhetoric with propaganda. The indoctrinator of the people Goebbels was thus presented as a great "rhetor."

It is hardly surprising that research also suffered and still suffers from such misjudgements.

One can only hope that the publication of an encyclopaedia on rhetoric will eliminate the prejudices and help meet the requirements of a society in which language is of paramount significance.

Wherever consensus has to be found on difficult problems, specific research findings "translated" from specialist jargon or an interview becomes decisive for an application rhetoric is *all-important*.

It goes without saying that it is (or should be) of prime importance in the world of politics, from Bismarck and Bebel to the German Bundestag.

In Tübingen an "Historical Dictionary of Rhetoric" is also being compiled. It makes it clear that the aim of rhetoric was never to turn black into white. The ethics of the speaker must never pale into insignificance behind the technique of speaking.

Since 1987 the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft has been sponsoring a project initiated by Gert Ueding, the director of the Seminar for General Rhetoric, which is being developed together with a philosophical dictionary.

Up to now there have been many brochures and booklets on the subject of rhetoric, but nothing more fundamental and comprehensive.

The encyclopaedia will include all significant terms and concepts, from A for *Affekte* (affects) to Z for *Zynismus* (cynicism).

The dictionary sets out to do more than just define. The five volumes, each with 1,000 pages, and the total of 1,300 headwords are designed as a "practical" aid, the organisational head of the project Gregor Kallivoda explained.

The dictionary is intended as a reference book for teachers, experts on German language and literature, politicians, journalists or theologians.

Categories such as *Beweis* (proof, evidence) or *Jesuiten-Rhetorik* (rhetoric of the Jesuits) are just as much a part of the dictionary as terms from the fields of homiletics and communication sciences; animation can be found alongside New Rhetoric or advertising.

Four experts are preparing the first volume for publication in 1991. Although the project funds are limited the mood is optimistic. In November a large symposium on this subject will be taking place with guests from Germany and abroad.

The renowned Niemeyer publishing house in Tübingen, which specialises in academic literature, has already agreed to publish the dictionary.

Reinhard Tschapke

(Die Welt, Bonn, 20 July 1989)

■ EDUCATION

An international comparison of study habits

The post-1992 internal market will herald Europe as both an economic and an educational entity. So increasing importance must be attached to the different national education systems, which is why the Bonn Education Ministry commissioned *a survey on the time spent at* university and the average age of graduates in seven industrialised countries. *Ulrich Teichler* and *Wolfgang Steube* of Kassel University vocational and university research centre here outline the survey's findings.

Regular statistical surveys in most of the seven countries (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States) fail to answer in full the following three questions:

- How old are students when they go to university?
- How long do they take to complete their university studies?
- How old are they when they graduate?

This doesn't mean the questions must remain unanswered. In some countries figures are compiled on a number of important aspects; in some cases occasional probes or surveys of limited sectors at university are a help.

Differences between the countries concerned are to some extent structurally predetermined. The age at which children first go to school, the number of years they spend there and the prescribed length of university courses differ.

In all countries covered, medical degree courses took between five and a half and seven years, frequently including traineeships.

The Netherlands excepted, all also have other specific degree courses that take longer than most others.

Yet in most countries degree courses generally take an accepted length of time: three years in England and Wales and four years in Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Scotland and the United States.

In Sweden the length varies considerably from course to course. In France there are further distinctions between categories of degree and, for that matter, of university.

Even so, generally speaking students who go straight from school to university and don't read subjects that take longer, such as medicine, graduate at 21 or 22 in Britain.

In the United States, France, Japan and the Netherlands they graduate at 22 or 23, in Sweden at between 22 and 24, in Italy at between 23 and 25.

In the Federal Republic of Germany graduation at 23 is virtually impossible. For all practical purposes no German students can hope to graduate before they are 24.

They will then have spent 13 years at school, followed by nine or ten semesters at university.

These figures don't take late starters into account; they can be due to factors beyond the universities' control, such as repeating a school year or doing military service (or its social service alternative for conscientious objectors).

Repeating a school year is almost unknown in Japan and the United States and most unusual in Britain and Sweden.

In France, Italy and the Netherlands it is far from uncommon. In some of the countries covered, many male students do military (or social) service prior to or during their university careers.

Conscription is the rule in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden.

In countries where students are fairly young when they graduate — Britain, Japan and the United States — there are professional armies or self-defence forces.

As for the speed at which students go through their course of study, there are two distinct categories of country:

- those where school-leavers go straight to university and generally complete their course in a prearranged period, such as Britain and Japan;
- *and those where interim periods* between leaving school and going to university, or studying for longer periods, is considered to be either the rule or inevitable and, in practice, is far from uncommon.

This is to some extent the case in France, definitely so in Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. Germany also comes in this category.

- The United States does not fit into either category. It has a variety of standards and practices.

In Britain going straight from school to university and graduating in three or four years' time is considered a matter of course. Facilities for mature students, such as the Open University, evening classes, polytechnics and the like, are regarded as separate and distinct.

In Japan too, going straight from school to university is the rule. Career and social status is more heavily subject than in other countries covered to the university where Japanese graduates studied and to their age. So it goes without saying that the year of birth and the year of graduation are a known factor where many colleagues are concerned. Know the one and you can be fairly sure of knowing the other.

In France, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden — not to mention the Federal Republic of Germany — only a minority of students seem to complete their courses in the approved period.

On average, this period is exceeded by 40 per cent or more.

Interestingly, in all these countries except France a striking number of young people — probably between 20 and 40 per cent — do not go straight from school to university.

Yet only in Sweden are interruptions, part-time studies, short or sandwich courses a widespread phenomenon (and even more widespread when courses lasting less than three years are taken into account).

The United States cannot be pigeonholed as a country with either "fast" or "slow" university courses. Over 90 per cent of full-time students go straight from school to college, and over half of them graduate as bachelors in, as a rule, four years. So differences in the length of time university students spend studying for a degree and their age on graduation are substantial in the countries covered.

This can be due to structural criteria or to the pattern of the course of study. It may be due to the university or to the student or to other factors.

Where the length of time taken to graduate is concerned, the following conclusions may be reached:

- In Britain a first degree takes less than three years on average. In Japan it takes about four and a half years.
- In the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States, students take between five and six years to complete their degree courses.
- In France, Germany and Italy, university students take about seven years to graduate.

U. Teichler/W. Steube

(Die Welt, Bonn, 25 July 1989)

Religious instruction: too few pupils, too few teachers

Religious instruction is the only subject that the constitution says must be offered at state schools.

Attendance is not compulsory and absence rates are high; and there are not enough teachers to teach it.

Both teachers and churchmen complain about the lack of interest among pupils. Some parents feel that lessons are too pious. Others would like to see more emphasis placed on purely religious aspects.

There are those who say the church should keep out of religious education in schools altogether and concentrate on its main task, catechism in the parishes.

To gather more exact information, the Commission for Education and Schools of the German Bishops' Conference commissioned two surveys by Allensbach opinion pollsters.

Questions were put to 810 Catholic religion teachers and 1,094 pupils from all types of school about their feelings about religion, the church and religious instruction.

Only pupils over 14 were included. And — an obvious weak point — only children who had not opted out of the lessons.

Forty-six per cent of the pupils classed themselves as "religious persons"; only two per cent said they were "convinced atheists."

Twenty four per cent described themselves as "not religious" and 28 per cent were "undecided."

Twenty nine per cent said they went to church "every or almost every Sunday"; 55 per cent went "seldom"; and 16 per cent "never."

Forty per cent of the pupils who claimed that they were religious expressed their dissatisfaction with the



Catholic church in its present form. Only 10 per cent said that they expressly approved of its image.

A breakdown of the types of school reveals that religiousness, going to church and the church as an institution are most popular among grammar school pupils and least popular in technical colleges.

This is also apparent with respect to the question of absence from religion lessons.

Although the rate of absence increases with the age of the pupils these rates are much higher in the technical colleges than in the senior classes of the grammar schools — despite the fact that the average age of the pupils in the latter is higher.

Almost 40 per cent had once considered no longer attending religion lessons.

On a nationwide basis between 15 and 20 per cent of all pupils opt out.

The surveys showed that the degree of religiousness is closely connected with the attitude of the parents towards religion and the church.

Seventy-six per cent of those children who described their parents as "very religious" also described themselves as "very religious"; only 12 per cent of the children in this category stated that they were "not religious."

Fifty-three per cent of the pupils who had not experienced "practical religion" at home stated that they had no ties to the church. Only 15 per cent of the pupils in this group stated the opposite.

Most of the religious and non-religious pupils are indifferent towards religious instruction; fewer pupils reject it altogether.

The findings make it clear that a child's parental background is a much more formative factor when it comes to religion than religious instruction at school.

Religion lessons are more likely to consolidate the religiousness already fostered by the parents.

The Allensbach study warns against expecting too much of religious education at school.

A back-up study to the main survey revealed that the governing bodies of the church and traditionally-minded Christians tend to expect too much of religious instruction rather than the public at large.

Almost 80 per cent of West German Catholics favour religious instruction (only four per cent reject *it altogether*), but they would like to see the promotion of qualities such as consideration for others, tolerance, social commitment and the development of personality as the primary learning goals. Aspects such as faith and the teaching of the church are viewed as only secondary elements.

The Allensbach survey interprets these findings as a secularised redefinition of the tasks of religious instruction which would then be widely accepted by sections of the populations which do not have such close church ties.

It maintains that such a secularisation represents a more serious threat to religious instruction than vehement attacks and opposition.

The study also shows that the roughly 65,000 Catholic religion teachers in the Federal Republic of Germany cannot ignore this change.

Of a list of 22 *possible tasks* for religious instruction the most *frequently* favoured were: the *development* of the personality and *the encouragement* of social *commitment*, the teaching of the Gospel and the discussion of questions relating to the meaning of life.

The consolidation of ties to the church or stating the "positions of the church", on the other hand, were among the six least popular tasks.

To infer from these findings that religion teachers are not "church-orientated" would fail to do justice to the situation.

The proximity of religion teachers to the official position of the church on certain issues depends on the problems and issues involved.

Aspects relating to the protection of life and human rights received popularity ratings of up to 80 per cent.

This "solidarity" falls to up to 20 per cent in the more controversial fields such as contraception, divorce, celibacy and papacy.


The broady-based Allensbach study does not claim to provide a conclusive concept.

Its intention is to give all the parties concerned facts and figures for a discussion on the future of religious instruction which can no longer be deferred.

Norbert Göttler

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 21 July 1989)

The Ruhr is running out of coal. The seams are exhausted. Because coal is to be an important part of Germany's energy requirements at least into the next century, it must be found somewhere. German coal cannot compete with overseas coal. It is too expensive. It is subsidised heavily to make it attractive to consumers. Mining companies are having to move out of the Ruhr to find new seams, and that means they are breaking new ground in more ways than one. People living in pleasant places don't want their environment ruined — they don't even want the threat of a little bit of ruination. Now about 800 buildings officially listed as being of historic interest are being threatened by the plans of a company, Ruhrkohle AG, to open up new seams north of the Ruhr in south Münsterland. A long-running legal battle has developed between the company and one of the landowners involved, Carl Albrecht Graf von Kanitz. He says the ground will subside and buildings, especially a castle he owns called Schloss Cappenberg, will be badly damaged. Ruhrkohle AG say the ground will not sink all that much and that, in any case, the sinking will be spread evenly over a 10-square-kilometre basin so that visually nothing will change. Now a preliminary court decision has given Ruhrkohle a first victory. It is allowed to tunnel some of the way. But a final decision is to be handed down in two years. Erwin Schneider takes up the story for the national daily, *Die Welt*.



There will be no compromise . . . Graf Kanitz on his Cappenberg estate.

(Photo: Manfred Vollmer)

■ THE ENVIRONMENT

A Graf battles to save his castle from King Coal

There was jubilation by 700 miners 960 metres under the earth. The jubilation was mixed with a new determination to fight on deep under the forest and castle of Cappenberg.

The occasion? Eight judges of the Federal Constitutional Court had given a preliminary go ahead to mining operations in a disputed area containing the Wald und Schloss von Cappenberg (the forest and castle at Cappenberg).

Poet Matthias Claudius once said: "The (now affected) forest stands black and silent." The judges have the job of deciding the forest's future. What they decide will not necessarily be a compromise.

This interim injunction marks one stage of a long legal dispute between the Essen-based Ruhrkohle AG and the combative Carl Albrecht Graf von Kanitz, the owner of Schloss und Wald Cappenberg. Beneath his property in an area south of Münster, Ruhrköhle has been mining coal for a year. For more than four years, Kanitz, a lawyer and farmer, has been trying to get a ban on mining. It has been an expensive process for both parties in terms of money, time and nerves.

And it will be another two years before the judges give their last word on the subject: economy versus ecology, energy versus protection of monuments, jobs versus the environment, the public interest versus property ownership.

There is no common ground any more between the two. The Graf, 40, says: "If the mining continues, the forest and castle will be ruined." And his friend and lawyer, Christoph Hollenders, takes an even tougher stance: "The path through the courts is irreversible. So we're not going to let any compromise stand in the way of preserving the forest, the church (the Stiftskirche Cappenberg, which is part of the area but does not belong to Graf Kanitz) and the castle. We shall fight to the end. We will not accept even the smallest amount of damage."

He dismisses an offer by Ruhrkohle management to guarantee the castle, which is listed as an historic monument. "You can only laugh at that. When coal barons say things like that, they are just laughing at you."

He mentions the case of another castle, Schloss Herten, which sank eight metres when the ground subsided through mining. This example was a typical example of unsuccessful protection measures. "It is now a completely new building. It is no longer an historic monument."

Graf Kanitz will not entertain the demand of the mining company to "tolerate the mining and accept compensation payment for damages." It is clear he wants neither financial nor other advantage. This is a point now conceded by Ruhrkohle managers.

A charge the firm had made, that the Graf wanted to sell the castle, which was built at the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th, for 400 million marks has since been pigeon-holed. It is a charge that Graf Kanitz has always vehemently denied.

"The question of money did occur once, when we talked to the company about assigning rights to the land (under which it wanted to dig). We had to talk about it but we managed to drag out the negotiations and we never demanded a price. Nor did we allow ourselves to become in any way caught up in any of their plans."

There is one aspect of the legal process which is causing Ruhrkohle AG worries. Although chairman of the board Klaus Schucht says that the ruling allowing mining to go ahead was "a high court ruling without ifs and buts," a new dimension had emerged which was impossible to predict.

He was referring to the approach to making good or preventing damage caused by mining. Up until now, the principle the coal industry has always pushed was "guaranteed value". Damaged property would be repaired and the coal industry would pay.

Now the possibility of an alternative has arisen. That is a guarantee of "intactness." If the court in its final decision — and that will not be until the end of 1990 — places the accent on guarantee of intactness, there would be wide-ranging consequences for the mining industry. Intactness could not be guaranteed if the ground subsided even a little bit and the buildings on it sank even one centimetre. Schucht says: "In that case, you could forget all about mining under the ground."

Ruhrkohle's attempts to mine north of the Ruhr itself is backed by the North Rhine-Westphalian *Land* government because pits in the Ruhr have been worked out.

But that would come to a halt if the 1990 decision decides that property on the surface above the workings must be subject to a "guarantee of intactness" instead of a guarantee of compensation for damage.

In this case, not only the estimated 800 buildings in the area classified as monuments would have to remain completely undamaged, but owners of private houses would also be able to assume that their properties would not be allowed to subside.

The arguments over monuments on one side and economic interests on the other is to be regarded against a background of discussion about coal policies in both Germany and the European Community.

Graf Kanitz was scathing about the "public-good" argument: coal mining was highly subsidised to the tune of 10.2 billion marks a year. If mining under Cappenberg were stopped until the final court decision, would the 86 million marks and 700 jobs mean very much on the overall commercial and economic situation? And if it did, who was in any case, paying the subsidies keeping the industry alive?

Lawyer Hollenders adds that at the end of 1988, Ruhrkohle AG had reserves of 10.4 million tons of coal in storage.

Heinz Horn is the chief of Ruhrkohle AG. He says that because the business depends so much on state support, costs must be kept as low as possible. The plans for Cappenberg were part of the scheme to hold costs down.

And the *Land* Economics Minister, Reimut Jochimsen, SPD, says: "Coal mining takes place in the public interest."

Graf Kanitz does not dispute that. But he says that there are alternative areas where pits could be opened. Ruhrkohle AG does not accept that there are. Schucht told the court that a pit in a neighbouring area would be closed in five years when it would be exhausted.

He asked the court not to make that fact public as a decision had not been taken. It stirred up a hornets' nest. The miners were outraged. Their representatives demanded explanations and spoke of lies.

But Schucht said in clarification: "Any other calculation is just naive. Everyone knows it. The fact is we have 15 million tons of coal and mine two million tons a year. There won't be any left in seven years."

Although German coal cannot compete on the world markets, it will continue to figure in domestic energy into the 21st century. That is a political decision. That means new seams must be opened to the north of the Ruhr.

Ruhrkohle won this first legal skirmish because the court could see no acute danger to castle and forest. Now the question for the court to answer is: what is the value of a monument? Because only the forest stands black and silent.

Erwin Schneider

(Die Welt, Bonn, 1 August 1989)

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bids farewell from Herbert von Karajan, a new future *must* begin.

Karajan's authority was a blessing for the festival city, but it could turn out to be a curse.

Although Karajan only had one voice his influence and authority was so irresistible that nothing could be done without or against him in "Karajanopolis."

In the city of Mozart, for example, he encouraged the construction of a huge festival building, in which Wagner, Verdi and Strauss would feel more at home than poor Mozart.

Although he admirably maintained "the standard" he did so at the expense of openness and a willingness to innovate, which could have made the festivals more exciting and up-to-date.

Institutions which enjoy the favourable influence of a *genius loci* and an incomparable tradition such as the Salzburg festival can by no means be continued with only more or less interesting modern characteristics.

Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Max Reinhard and Richard Strauss lent their support to maintain the Salzburg festival, and during the Nazi period Bruno Walter was able (up until 1937) to turn his back on Hitler's Bayreuth and allow Lotte Lehmann or a Rosé quartet to perform there.

Achievements of the highest standard and plucky enterprise are interdependent.

Arrogant young critics, who love to criticise Salzburg as "the beautiful corpse of yesteryear", are nevertheless glad to be able to listen to the world's best interpreters of music in the festival theatre.

What Salzburg needs now is ideas. Just muddling through will not help.

In the arts nothing seems more easily lost or is more difficult to sustain than the brilliance of the big festivals.

Joachim Kaiser

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 29 July 1989)

■ HORIZONS

The wicker beach chair discovers greener fields



The traditional *Strandkorb*, a wicker beach chair with a rounded hood used on the beaches along Germany's Baltic and North Sea coasts, is a timeless symbol of idyllic beach life.

Holidaymakers have enjoyed the refuge of the snug two-seater for more than a century.

Now the beach chair is moving inland. The swing hammock which was so popular during the 1960s on patios and balconies and in winter gardens all over the country is being replaced by the beach chair.

Rudi Schardt and his firm, Friesländer Strandkörbe, on the island of Sylt send 80 per cent of the top-quality wickerwork chairs to mainland Germany and all over the world, to Greece, Iceland, the USA, Britain (including Harrods store in London) and even Japan.

Ninety per cent of the North Frisian luxury models are sold to private owners at prices of between DM1,500 and DM6,000. Less luxurious models come much cheaper — for 400 marks.

For Schardt, who comes from a basket-making family, the "wind-proof" and "weather-proof" beach chair is ideal.

As opposed to the deck chair or *lounger*, *it can be used all year round.*

More and more people want one. Gerd Müsing, whose firm, called Schatzruhe, has been selling them for use in the garden for five years, says business is booming.

The beach chair boom has taken off in a really big way throughout Germany this year.

Müsing's firm offers 150 different patterns for the chair's inside lining, but most people still prefer the traditional white stripes with yellow, blue and red.

There is a growing demand for willow wickerwork. Whereas the chairs made of synthetic materials are more popular on the beaches private owners prefer chairs made of wood.

As was to be expected there are plenty of firms on the market offering cut-price chairs.

Many of the big stores have included beach chairs in their range of items in line with the motto: a holiday aura which can be created in everyone's back garden. The question is: will the "summer residence" priced at DM400 survive over a longer period?

Schardt and Müsing feel that a good finish is extremely important. All the metal parts and mountings of their products are rust-proof, the wooden parts impregnated, the "modern loungers" adjustable, and the design robust.

A handful of basket-makers, most of them in family businesses, share the market.

It usually takes eight to ten hours to weave a basket.

This craftsmanship has its price. Chairs with special fittings such as more resistent upholstery or adjustable side sections can cost anything up to DM3,000.

This extremely practical and comfortable "box" for one or two persons is a German invention.

Back in 1882 Elfriede Maltzahn, who suffered from rheumatism, asked the court basket-maker Wilhelm Bartelmann from Rostock to construct a comfortable and wind-sheltered beach chair in his small workshop.

The basket-maker designed a chair which looked more like an erect clothes basket with canvas lining, the very first *Strandkorb*.

Frau Maltzahn was able to enjoy the sea air and the sun on Warnemünde beach sheltered from the wind.

Just one year later basket-maker Bartelmann advertised his beach chairs in the newspapers.


This was the start of their success story on the beaches of the North and Baltic Sea.

The rather unsociable one-seater soon turned into a cosy two-seater. The wooden frame was woven in wicker and lined inside with striped canvas material. The users had to sit upright in the first models.

Johann Falck, from Rostock, invented the "semi-lounger", a chair in which half of the back-rest could be removed. This led on to the beach chair with an adjustable upper section.

Apart from the fact that they afford protection against wind and weather today's beach chairs have very little in common with the models of the early

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Getting away from it all with a *Strandkorb*. (Photo: Sven Simon)

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public's memory. There was also a conflict with Hamburg's mayor Voscherau over the uncovered costs for the appearance of the Kirov theatre in Hamburg.

No-one knows how the problem of a possible festival deficit this summer could be resolved.

Björn Engholm has made it clear that he has no intention of providing more than the DM4m in Land funds already provided.

In public Engholm still stands up for Frantz, but his patience does have limits.

Remarks such as "In the long run a festival is never tied to just one person" speak for themselves. *Ocke Peters*

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 28 July 1989)





No amount of money will make me change my mind, says Hannelore Kraus. (Photo: dpa)

One woman's campaign to halt plans to build skyscraper

Frankfurt house-owner Hannelore Kraus, 49, looks like succeeding in her one-woman campaign to thwart plans to build the tallest skyscraper in Europe near the city's main railway station.

Mannheim property developers were granted preliminary planning permission to build a tower block 260 metres (853ft) tall, the Campanile.

Frau Kraus has already blocked further progress on the project for four and a half months, and her point-blank refusal, as a neighbouring property-owner, to sanction the project could well block it for good.

She has been offered millions by the developers but remains firmly convinced that the block would stick out like a sore thumb and be totally out of place in the city-centre area, the Gutleutviertel, where she lives.

Eight of the nine neighbours whose permission was pending have given the go-ahead. But not No. 9, Hannelore Kraus. "Not even if they were to offer me DM20m," she says. "I still feel the Campanile mustn't be built."

Why is she so staunchly opposed to the property developers and determined to resist their financial clout? Because she was born and bred in the Gutleutviertel. Her roots are there.

The Gutleutviertel has an atmosphere that isn't easy to sacrifice, and she is convinced the Campanile would ruin it.

The developers have offered her more than cash. When she clearly wasn't to be bought for money, they promised her to do "something good for the area," such as building a community centre to be named after her.

Frau Kraus was still resolutely opposed. "If my name were to stand for having thwarted the tower project: would be a much greater tribute to my memory," she says.

Yet she can't readily afford to turn down the cash offer. A few million marks would come in handy to repay debts or refurbish her three houses in the district (they need renovating: houses always do).

But she is a woman of principle, and one principle she learnt from her parents was: "You don't sell your grandmother and you don't sell your soul."

Having experienced at first hand that "cash is no object" in projects of this kind, she is — *if anything* — even less keen to name her price.

Basically, she feels, Frankfurt ought never have left it to *neighbouring* property-owners to decide whether or not the Campanile was to be built as planned.

She has called on the city's new council, a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens, to come out clearly against the plan to build Europe's tallest skyscraper.

The new council is now reviewing the paperwork to see whether its Christian Democratic predecessor made any formal mistakes in granting preliminary planning permission.

Frau Kraus's campaign is extremely popular locally, although a handful of people have accused of standing in the path of progress in the city.

The developers are now trying to bar her from the proceedings by legal means. A helicopter survey shows the distance between her house and the proposed site to be 90 metres.

The developers feel this is most encouraging. According to their interpretation of the regulations, that is too far away for her permission to be required.

She could only refuse if her property were less than 75 metres away, they say. *Klaus Tscharnke*

(Allgemeine Zeitung, Mainz, 26 July 1989)

■ HOLDUP-MURDER TRIAL

Hostage deaths blamed on series of police errors

Süddeutsche Zeitung

A year ago, two men robbed a bank in the North Rhine Westphalia centre of Gladbeck. Then followed a drama in which the men drove up and down north Germany, into and out of Holland and in which two young hostages were killed.

The trial has now begun. It has refocused attention of the part played by the police and politicians responsible for the police. Both have come in for extremely heavy criticism. One *Land* minister had to resign and another has hung on despite pressure to step down.

The hijacking was unprecedented. Never before have the German authorities been so hoodwinked by a couple of gangsters in the full glare of media coverage.

For 54 hours the authorities were apparently powerless. The media allowed the hijackers to tell their version of events.

The two armed gangsters, determined to stop at nothing, were screened live on TV: with pistols pointed at their hostages' heads or being interviewed in their getaway car, surrounded by pressmen and passers-by in a crowded Cologne pedestrian precinct.

It was a media event. The police appeared as hapless bystanders. Whatever they did, it seemed to be wrong.

Details of the police role from Gladbeck to Bremen and to the bloodshed that ended the drama on the autobahn near Bonn, reveal a pattern of mistakes.

They are links in a chain of mishaps and missed opportunities, and no-one would now dispute this.

What did happen? The interim report by the parliamentary commission of inquiry set up by the North Rhine-Westphalian state assembly in Düsseldorf sums it up in two brief paragraphs:

"At 7.55 a.m. on 16 August 1988 two masked, armed men, later identified as Hans-Jürgen Rösner and Dieter Degowski, broke into the Gladbeck branch of the Deutsche Bank and took the cashier and a female clerk hostage.

"As the police felt the hostages could not be freed in the bank without jeopardising their lives, the gangsters were allowed to make a getaway at 9.40 p.m. In Gladbeck they picked up their accomplice, Rösner's girlfriend Marion Löblich.

"After driving round North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony and Bremen, they hijacked a bus in Bremen at 7 p.m. the following day, taking the passengers hostage.

"The bus was then used as a getaway vehicle. At the Grundbergsee autobahn service station Degowski shot and killed Emanuele de Georgi, 15.

Via Holland, where the gangsters switched to a car, the journey continued to Wuppertal and Cologne and the Frankfurt autobahn, where the police used force to end the Odyssey near Bonn at 1.40 p.m. on 18 August 1988.

"A hostage, Silke Bischoff, was shot and killed in the shoot-out, by one of the gangsters, it seems safe to say."

The case is now being tried before an Essen court. Rösner and Degowski are accused of jointly committing two murders (de Georgi and Bischoff), and Löblich of being an accessory to the murder of Silke Bischoff.

The prosecution's indictment is an 81-page document. Two hundred witnesses and 14 experts are to be heard.

The trio are also accused of hijacking, of taking hostages with fatal consequences and of blackmail while committing a robbery.

Last but not least, they are accused of attempted murder in several cases, having fired at police officers and others on several occasions during the chase.

But what conclusions have politicians and the police reached from the Gladbeck hijack case, and what conclusions ought they to reach?

The case is still under investigation by parliamentary commissions in North Rhine-Westphalia and Bremen.

In Bremen, Home Affairs Senator Bernd Meyer, SPD, resigned in view of the serious mistakes the police had made in the case. In North Rhine-Westphalia Interior Minister Herbert Schnoor, SPD, has withstood persistent pressure to resign.

He was called on to resign by the Düsseldorf Opposition days after the shoot-out, and the main argument continues to be that the Interior Ministry was at least indirectly responsible for the mistakes made by the police.

Ministry officials are said to have misread the situation for two days and to have played a responsible part in the course of action the police took. So Schnoor must go.

The Opposition Christian and Free Democrats in North Rhine-Westphalia have since sought incessantly and by all means to lend substance to suspicions that the Minister issued instructions that influenced police tactics.

What began as a clash over a specific criminal case soon became an all-out attack on an unpopular Interior Minister accused of being a "soft-liner."

Dr Schnoor stands for a "conciliatory state." He has supported the claims of Düsseldorf squatters to a right to live in their Kiefernstrasse squat.

He is opposed to beefing up the law in connection with demonstrations. He is in favour of foreign residents voting in local government elections. He is opposed to legally authorising the security authorities to shoot to kill as a last resort to save lives.

The sniping at Interior Minister Herbert Schnoor was partly intended as an indirect attack on SPD Premier Johannes Rau and the *Land* government.

So the Social Democrats and the government closed ranks. Schnoor was backed to the hilt even though he has not always cut a convincing figure.

He has been slow to admit that the police made mistakes and only gradually owned up to mishaps after previously stating that the police's behaviour had been beyond reproach.

The line of defence is clear. Dr Schnoor is said at no point to have interfered with police tactics. There was no political concept behind police decisions. The only instructions he gave were to call in the crack anti-terrorist unit, the GSG 9.

Dr Schnoor told the commission of inquiry that he saw no reason — and still sees none — to resign solely on account of failure in fighting serious crime.

He says he still feels the fundamental decisions taken were right.

What, fundamentally, ought the police otherwise to have done? They certainly missed several opportunities of freeing the hostages at no risk to the hostages' lives.

They did so partly because the gangsters were misread and partly because the flying squads were not at the ready when the opportunity arose.

The gangsters took a break at the Grönegau autobahn service station, going to the toilet. The police were a mile and a half away.

A similar opportunity was missed in Hagen, while in Bremen Rösner and Löblich went shopping, leaving Degowski to look after the first two hostages.

Degowski slipped out to answer a call of nature. He briefly left the two hostages on their own in the getaway car.

This list of missed opportunities could be continued. There was, for that matter, the ill-advised arrest of Marion Löblich in an autobahn service station toilet. (Directly afterwards, Emanuele de Georgi was killed).

Police equipment and arms seem to have been either faulty or unsuitable at various times.

Above all, and incomprehensibly, the vehicles that accompanied the hijacked bus and the final getaway car did not include an ambulance.

These details and countless other failures and mishaps led to the final fiasco. Yet the fundamental dilemma remains.

Ought the police, come what may, to end a hostage-taking at the scene of the first crime, risking the death of the hostages to prevent further risks to life and limb?

Hostages are members of the public and no less entitled to police protection than anyone else.

And how is one to reconcile the contradictions inherent in providing hijackers with a getaway vehicle yet trailing them in order to make use of any opportunity to free the hostages and take the hijackers into custody?

The *Land* Interior Ministers met in Cologne in April and failed, in their review of the Gladbeck hijacking, to reach a new and convincing conclusion.


Improvements in equipment, organisation and coordination are clearly needed, but they alone will not solve the problem. No-one — not even Bavaria — has yet come up with instructions suitable for use in every case.

A year ago the Bavarians, jubilant at the discomfiture of others, staged an exercise to show the media how they would handle a hijacking.


But it was only make-believe, with police officers posing as gangsters.

"Next time," Dr Schnoor surmises, "there will probably be a shoot-out sooner." *Michael Birnbaum*

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 29 July 1989)



Defendant Degowski and hostage Bischoff. Shortly afterwards, the girl was shot dead. (Photo: dpa)



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years. The design, however, has remained more or less the same.

One hundred years ago the dress regulations on the beach were determined by prudish moral standards.

The world was pretty buttoned up back in those days, holidaymakers sat as stiff as a poker in their beach chairs.

People emerged from the changing cubicles on the beaches almost as fully dressed as when they went in.

The woman of the world wore breeches stretching down to her calves or ankles, which were bound at the bottom like knickerbockers. In addition, a smock with a belt and a bodice underneath.

This bathing costume, a veritable monstrosity, was originally made of a black and scratchy semi-woollen fabric.

The perfect dress included black woollen socks and canvas bathing shoes. The culmination of the bulky costume was a puffy rubber bathing cap.

At the turn of the century bathers started to peel off. The veiling woollen and flannel tunics led on to today's monokinis.

Up until the 1920s it was still regarded as unseeming to change in the beach chair.

As no-one at that time was interested in sunbathing and the cubicle was available for changing people had no trouble complying with these rules.

Roughly 50,000 beach chairs are lined up along the coasts of Schleswig-Holstein alone every season.

Every year these beach resorts buy 8,000 new beach chairs at a price of DM5m.

The biggest client is Westerland, on Sylt itself, where 4,000 await their customers. *Dagmar Haas-Pilwat*

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 28 July 1989)